■ PERSPECTIVE

Strategies of defence and war: the hidden contradictions emerge

Defence policymakers in Nato countries are heading straight into a blind alley by debating in public what is to be done in the event of an emergency. i.e. war.

In doing so they are not only revealing more about defence contradictions that have until now been kept quiet with great effort.

They also prejudice any change in security policy.

The peace movement is in no way involved. So far only the military and political establishments are concerned.

The crux of the problem was described by French sociologist and security expert Raymond Aron in 1964:

"The threat of war, even thermonuclear war, has become part and parcel of world affairs. Yet in most cases a war would contradict common sense.

"It would not be an extension of but an end to politics. This contradiction makes reconciliation betwen enemies and complete confidence between allies impossible."

The basic contradiction has not only persisted; it has been intensified. The reason has undoubtedly been because scepticism about a deterrent system hased on a constant arms build-up has not prevailed.

Practical politics continues to be governed by people for whom military strength and the capacity to wage war are unshakable yardsticks by which they think and act.

One result of this policy was, in the late 1960s, the flexible response as a strategy by which to counter an enemy attack.

One aim of the flexible response strategy was to reconcile military and political contradictions within Nato or, as Aron put it, to restore complete confidence between the allies.

This bid was doomed to failure in that the flexible response strategy, which continues to be Nato policy, was intended to harmonise the irreconcilable.

1. Security interests differed between the United States on the one hand and Europe on the other. The most momentous instance of continued mistrust within Nato must surely be the controversial dual-track decision.

2. Only the ability to wage war was capable of preventing war from being waged, it was argued to the exclusion of the realisation that a war in Europe would not only mean the end of politics but the end of Europe.

Luftwaffe General Johannes Steinhoff (retd) has described in drastic terms the fateful consequences of the flexible response strategy for military planing.

General Steinhoff, who was chairman of Nato's military committee until the mid-1970s, did so in his 1976 book *Wohin treibt die Nato?* (Where is Nato Heading?).

"To this day it has indeed been difficult," he wrote, "to convince the military that nuclear arms are no substitute for conventional artillery.

"They are not a tactical weapon for use in a lengthy exchange of nuclear strikes; they are a 'deterrent'...

"The belief that nuclear weapons were controllable by continuing battle using decontaminated men on board



radiation-proof armoured vehicles had reached a macabre degree of unreality."

This belief persists to some extent, as was shown in early August in Brussels when Nato countries sought in vain to reach agreement on a reduction in the number of nuclear warheads (about 6,000) stockpiled around Europe.

While the Europeans felt about half were unnecessary, the United States was only prepared to dispense with about a quarter of the stockpile.

The suspicion remains that it is not the aim that justifies the means but the means (weapons) that justify the aim (defence planning).

The development and deployment of increasingly wide-ranging and accurate weapons is accompanied by a strategy debate on the possible use of these weapons.

German politicians, military men and other experts have largely refrained from voicing their views on the subject, realising that the German public are traditionally (one might almost say) uninterested in strategic issues.

It has taken the signature of a leading Bundeswehr officer to break the taboo, and even he was a year late in doing so.

AirLand Battle 2000 is the title of a survey published in August 1982. It is prefaced by Edward C. Meyer, the US Army chief of staff, and Meinhard Glanz, commander-in-chief of the Bundeswehr.

The survey was recently reviewed in a Swiss journal, whereupon a dispute began in Germany that could hardly have been more embarrassing.

Outraged Social Democratic MPs in Bonn demanded to be told more about the contents of the survey, details of how it came to be written, and clamoured, to be on the safe side, for the resignation of General Glanz.

They had evidently overlooked the fact that the survey was written and published in August last year when the Bonn government was a coalition led by their own party.

They had also forgotten a year ago to ask SPD Defence Minister Hans Apel what was going on at the Ministry, and forgotten to do so since.

There has been an unfortunate predilection to allocate more blame than there appears to have been guilt, with the result that the problem has vanished in a fog of half-truths and misunderstandings.

What actually happened, in chronological sequence, was as follows:

● In March 1981 a US Army report entitled *The Air-Land Battle and Corps 86* was published under the auspices of General Donn A. Starry, the designated Nato C-in-C Europe.

Against the background of modern weapons developments new operational concepts of future air-land warfare were outlined and conclusions reached for the US corps of 1986.

The crucial innovation is apparent from the following point made in the report: "Attacks to the enemy's rear are not a luxury; they are an unqualified necessity in order to win."

● Findings in the report were included in the US Army's Field Manual 100-5 in August 1982, thereby becoming official policy.

General Glanz had nothing to do with this report nor with the field manual that resulted from it.

● At the same time as the f... *AirLand Battle 2000* was p... title was similar to that of the... report but it was made out... US-German project.

In it, battlefield conditi... mined as they are expected... the year 2015. This paper, ... pages as printed, is the bas... tion.

The dispute is justified ... ry. The survey takes up whe... papers left off and consist... along the lines of the Reaga... tration.

The assumption is, to quo... dential adviser Colin S. Gra... tory is possible.

The German-American ... air-land war in the year 20... on current strategic principle... rence as outlined in Nato ... MC 14/3 on the flexible respo...

This diplomatic gesture is ... make the survey accept... discussion-worthy at Nato h... in Brussels.

But in the key passages of ... entitled Military Operational... the principles of current US... are apparent.

"If a numerically inferi... waits with his counter-attack... superior enemy has penetrat... tory," the survey says, "it i... too late for his own forces ... the invasion."

Whatever strategy may b... argument continues, the mili... must, if he is to win, put ... four interlocking measures.

He must beat the enemy ... line of fighting. He must at... his own hinterland. He mus... initiative in battle. He must ... land war fast and decisively.

Thus, "if the principles of ... are rightly understood and ... forces can fight and win ... they may be numerically inf...

Quite apart from the fact ...

Continued on page ...

Bonn politicians and military men are following with keen interest the progress of the debate in Whitehall on the future role of the British Rhine Army.

New debate on logic of Nato deployment

The debate was triggered by a leader in *The Times* on 17 August headed Rethink on the Rhine.

The article concluded, with no ifs and bus, that the Nato forward defence strategy lacked operational logic. It was insisted on solely for political reasons. These reasons needed revaluation.

The BAOR forms part of the forward defence of which *The Times* is so critical. It consists, as far as its ground forces are concerned, of an army corps stationed in north Germany.

It is jointly responsible with a Belgian, Dutch and German corps for defending the border between Hamburg and the Solling under the command of Nato's C-in-C Northag.

According to official figures the BAOR has roughly 55,000 men stationed in Germany. In the 1982-83 financial year Britain spent £1.5bn on it.

In 1981, according to a BAOR publication, the cost of maintaining the Rhine Army was put at roughly DM3.25bn.

The Times now argues, especially on account of the high cost, that Nato defence forces in Germany ought to be regrouped with a view to reducing the size of the BAOR.

It could then be delinked from its defence sector and responsibility for this sector given to the Bundeswehr.

The crucial argument in favour of this proposal is that Britain has no flexibility in the deployment of its army. Apart from territorials stationed in Britain, the UK has only the one army corps based in Germany.

The Times says this amounts to being "bogged down guarding every forward inch of a 63-kilometre front." (That is, the border between East and West Germany).

After streamlining, the paper envisages the BAOR being used as a tactical reserve by Northag, which would save Britain money and ease the tactical rigidity in Nato's military thinking.

Ideas of this kind are viewed with the greatest scepticism in Bonn. What the *Times* leader-writer refers to as tactical rigidity is, as German politicians and military men see it, the crucial feature of Nato's aim.

This aim is defined as ensuring, without extending operations to Warsaw Pact territory, that East Bloc ... brought to a halt as near to ... German border as possible ... forces available.

A further aspect, from the ... viewpoint, is the idea of ... among Western partners in Na...

Bonn officials cannot imag... as one of the leading membe... handing over to a German co... rect military responsibility on ... German border.

The Times itself expects d... ing effects of this kind to resul... proposal. It feels the Belg... Dutch might then also want ... their army corps from forwar... of north Germany.

Responsibility for their sec... border could then likewise be ... to the Bundeswehr.

Bonn officials know only ... that Dutch and Belgian poli... only waiting for some such s... to be made so they can endors...

So it is argued on the Rhine ... *Times* article could have fateful ... quences if the British govern... to decide to make similar prop...

Bonn has noted with some ... Sir David Fraser, the former ... CIGS, has noted in a letter to ... paper that the cost of main... BAOR is a low price to pay for ... Europe.

Rüdiger ...

(Die Welt, ...)


The German Tribune

A WEEKLY REVIEW OF THE GERMAN PRESS

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ISSN 0016-8858

...burg, 11 September 1983
...-second year - No. 1099 - By air

...ir tragedy puts East-West ...ffairs back in melting pot



...e South Korean airliner shot down ...outh-west of Sakhalin was not the ...t of a pardonable mistake, of an ...ent of human error or of a misin...retation of the facts.

...e tragedy was triggered by the au...tic command structure of a totali...n system for whom human life is ...important.

...e night-time order to fire at the ...ng 747 given to the Soviet intercep...ts sent up to tail the intruder tells ...e about the contrasting views on ...ce in East and West than any offi... survey.

... pilot's navigation error sent 269 ...ple to their deaths merely because ...Soviet Union, a superpower, felt ...ened by a jumbo jet full of sleep... passengers.

...ose who constantly talk of peace ...t the same time use military force ...nst people and their fundamental ...ts need hardly be surprised by ...wing mistrust of their policies.

...trage at the inhuman behaviour of ...Soviet Union is worldwide. No-one ...eliably forecast at present what ef...t may have on world affairs.

...t the East-West talks on arms limi...n and missile cuts are certain to be ...ected to much heavier pressure. ...ress will be slower and more slow ...painful than ever.

...merica is stunned as it was after the ...et invasion of Afghanistan. Presi... Reagan cut short his holiday and ... a session of the National Security Council.

...othing will be the same again.

...nn handed a strongly worded prot... to Soviet ambassador Vladimir Se...nov. It condemned an "incompre...ible act of insuperable brutality."

...ould a similar incident one day ...en elsewhere in the world if a So... commanding officer again pressed ...-button controlling his country's ...gerated security requirements?

...his is a question we shall have to ...in Western Europe in particular, ...e the pace and density of civil avia... lead almost daily to individual ...raft veering off course.

...hey could only too easily lead to a ...-on clash with East Bloc anti-air...t precautions.

...veryone has a right to security, in...ding the right to protection from ...ionage. But in peacetime airliners ... lose their way cannot simply be ... down as spy planes or attacking ...craft.

When the Soviet Union, unlike all other states, resorts to force it even claims a legal right.

Henry Kissinger as US Secretary of State discovered time and again that the greatest difficulties in negotiating with the Kremlin arose from the Soviet claim to total security.

This basic line of Moscow's policy has been a hallmark of Soviet diplomacy for decades regardless who was in power.

It could only achieve its ambition if other states were prepared to make do with no more than relative security themselves.

This addiction to absolute security affected Stalin's demarcation line running the length of Germany just as it had a bearing on Brezhnev's invasion of Afghanistan or Andropov's continuing stranglehold in Poland.

There is no other explanation to account for the nonsensical medium-range missile build-up by the Soviet Union in Europe.

The Soviets want advantage, not parity.

The destruction of the airliner is just another expression of this root-and-branch Soviet security policy with its contempt for human life.

The tragedy off the Soviet coast was on the eve of 1 September, the 44th anniversary of the outbreak of the Second World War and a day dedicated to the cause of peace.

The attack must affect the missile modernisation debate in the Federal Republic of Germany.

But care must be taken on both sides to ensure that emotions do not gain the upper hand. A reversion to Cold War would be disastrous.

The arms build-up in both East and West makes mutual balanced arms reduction measures essential.

Unilateral prior concessions by the West, as called for by the peace movement, might well jeopardise peace rather than promote it.

This is what Nato says. The Sakhalin missile incident supports it.

Hermann Dexheimer

(Allgemeine Zeitung Mainz, 3 September 1983)

(Cartoon: Hanel/Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger)

Soviet reaction to the shooting 'unmasks big-power cynicism'

Would the Soviet Union have pushed the button if the aircraft had been American instead of South Korean?

Probably not. The commanding officer at ground control whose job it was to give the MiG pilot the order to shoot would be unlikely to have run the risk.

Because of the tremendous consequences responsibility for foreseeable political consequences he would probably not have taken the decision without double-checking with Moscow.

The repercussions that have now occurred could hardly have been more far-reaching if a US airliner had been shot down.

And it is not just because US citizens, including a Congressman, were on board the South Korean aircraft.

Shooting down the South Korean jumbo jet was disgraceful and cannot possibly be justified. But the way in which the Soviet Union has chosen to release information on the subject has been alarming.

The Soviet silence, the denial and misrepresentation of fact, doubtless to be followed by bids to justify unjustifiable behaviour and counter-attacks on Western criticism and expressions of outrage have unmasked the great-power cynicism of the Soviet system more clearly than any event since the invasion of Afghanistan.

Before the crucial round of missile talks in Geneva and the purportedly successful conclusion of the Helsinki review conference in Madrid, the Soviet Union has demonstrated in a ghastly manner what practical importance it attaches to the exchange of information and to confidence-building measures.

How does Moscow assess the Helsinki accords it signed in 1975? Just a scrap of paper! What about the hot line between Moscow and Washington? Just an old and unreliable East-West telecom installation!

Paradoxical though it may sound, the Sakhalin incident might not have led to the chill in East-West ties that now seems inevitable.

Honest information from Moscow on the eve of the Geneva talks and the Madrid conference might even have had a confidence-building effect.

It could have done so if Mr Andropov had promptly called Washington on the hot line, the Kremlin had admitted to political responsibility for an unpardonable military over-reaction, expressed regret over the victims and immediately said it would pay full compensation.

The 269 victims on board the Korean jumbo would still not have been brought back to life but their deaths would no longer have been so totally meaningless.

Instead, the Soviet Union has behaved throughout as though there were serious doubts whether the warning shot fired at the aircraft was just a warning or a deliberate coup de grace.

Even the Italian Communist newspaper, *L'Unità*, gives rise to doubts whether the outcome was unintentional. "The hypothesis that the plane was shot down as a merciless measure to protect

Continued on page 2

IN THIS ISSUE

■ WORLD AFFAIRS

Begin's resignation means postponement of Kohl's visit to Israel

German-Israeli ties had never seemed as close as on the eve of Chancellor Kohl's planned visit to Jerusalem. It was from Bonn that the Israelis first learnt of Prime Minister Begin's resignation.

The reason for this early information was not any special intimacy but the fact that Dr Kohl and a party of nearly 100 journalists were poised to fly to Israel.

The Chancellor agreed with the Israeli government that the visit should be postponed.

This will not impose a burden on German-Israeli ties. They are basically sound, although not free from periodic upsets.

In Jerusalem Helmut Kohl's readiness to visit Israel so soon after assuming office was appreciated and welcomed. His predecessor, Helmut Schmidt, had long been unwilling to make the visit and was in the end unable to.

Now he has had to postpone his visit at the shortest notice the Chancellor has been well advised not to overdo his consideration for Israel.

He plans to go ahead and visit several Arab countries early next month regardless whether or not he is able to visit Israel first.

Israel currently has other issues on its mind than the Bonn Chancellor's visit and is consequently less interested in his friendly overtures than it might otherwise have been (and fundamentally remains).

Mr Begin is not just anyone. He is a statesman so astute a critic as the late Nahum Goldmann felt was the greatest Israel had had in its 35-year history, including its first head of government, David Ben Gurion.

Goldmann's judgement was based both on Mr Begin's "good" deeds and on his "bad" ones, on his role as leader of an underground terrorist organisation and as the Prime Minister who held out the hand of peace to Egypt.

Reconciliation with Israel's main adversary after four wars was undoubtedly the foremost political, diplomatic and personal achievement of Menachem Begin.

His resignation at a time when he can no longer be of benefit to his country may one day be seen as yet another major achievement of Begin the statesman.

The reasons, personal and political, that prompted him to reach his decision are self-evident. Yet it comes as a surprise after nearly 30 years spent contesting his country's political leadership with a sentiment of divine mission.

Leading statesmen usually fail to realise when their day is done. Mr Begin has always been a man of his own decisions, a sick and sorely-troubled man and a head of government whose domestic and foreign policies were dogged by lack of success.

Yet no-one really imagined he would resign. He threatened to do so in March last year if the Knesset refused to give him a vote of confidence. He lost the vote but stayed in office.

But that was before the Lebanon campaign, before the refugee massacres at Sabra and Shatila and before the death of his wife and of his Deputy Premier and personal friend Simcha Ehrlich.

A first sign of his impending resignation was the seemingly unmotivated cancellation of a visit to Washington just before his 70th birthday in July.

The deadline for his momentous announcement of his determination to resign, on the eve of Chancellor Kohl's visit, seems to have been no coincidence.

Mr Begin had personally extended the invitation to the new Bonn Chancellor, but it was no secret that he did not relish the prospect of shaking hands with a German head of government and listening to the German national anthem being played by an Israeli military band.

The more imminent the prospect grew, the less he liked it. It may not have influenced his decision to resign as such but it will certainly have influenced his timing emotionally.

Mr Begin was long implacably anti-German, both for general and for personal reasons. He just didn't feel able to put a personal end to the darkest chapter in German history.

So his resignation may well serve the cause of German-Israeli relations, which could well do with improvement, just as it may ease the quest for peace in the Middle East, a peace to which Menachem Begin has made a historic contribution.

Heinz Mörsberger

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 31 August 1983)

Ministerial session reveals the extent of EEC problems

The first special session of about 30 EEC Ministers was announced with much bombast. It was called to avert the Common Market's imminent insolvency, but it only showed what a terrible state the European Community is in.

Everyone knows the number of tasks the countries of Western Europe can no longer handle on their own is increasing.

Yet shortage of funds, growing nationalism and even increasing xenophobia are make it steadily more difficult for the governments of parliamentary democracies to pursue multilateral integration policies.

A policy of integration would basically mean joining forces in such a way that one country temporarily took another's into account and made sacrifices for the sake of the greater whole and the common benefit.

That was Europe's aim in 1952 with the coal and steel community and in 1958 when the Common Market was set up. But what has become of it?

Rainmakers have for months been writing articles in which they have sought to prove that the figuratively drought-stricken EEC is in a much better condition than it is.

This is the approach of the poor student who feels his only hope is to point at others whose grades are even worse.

In terms of what could be accomplished (and needs doing) by means of an intelligent and prudent policy of integration, the current condition of Europe is enough to make you weep.

The mammoth session of EEC Ministers (foreign, finance and agriculture) in Brussels merely served to prove the point.

Everyone insists on maintaining the Common Agricultural Policy in the sector where farmers in their country benefit (always assuming the farmers' vote is important enough).

France makes common cause with Holland, Ireland and Denmark in defending, say, the butter mountain, whereas Britain is equally keen on butter subsidies, but because cuts would increase its important bill.

Further unsatisfactory repercussions of this inability to make concessions for the sake of integration are the failure to establish an economic and monetary union, a monetary system that includes neither Britain nor Greece and a common foreign policy that doesn't deserve the name.

The European Community was not even able to take joint action at the Geneva talks on Palestine. Low-ranking observers took part, wielding their ballpoint pens on the EEC's behalf. There was no sign of a Western European policy.

The list of unfinished business could be continued virtually ad infinitum. In 1972, for instance, a common industrial policy was resolved at a Common Market summit meeting.

All that came of it were bids to bolster ailing industries. There has certainly been no sign of European high tech as a result.

Periodic mention is made in the European Parliament at Strasbourg of the need for a greater common defence effort. But few European feel called on to do anything; most are content to rely on America.

Money naturally lies at the root of it all. In politics as in everyday life it may not make you happy but you have to have it.

At the end of the Brussels EEC summit last March we were told that the Stuttgart summit in June would be a working session with a tremendous determination and output.

In Stuttgart the Council of Ministers was called on to reach decision. The spirit in which they have set about it has now been seen in Brussels. To take and not to count the cost seems to be their motto.

If only one knew, as a Frenchman, a German or a Luxembourger, ways and means of looking after peace and common interests without the European Community, one could but counsel resigning from the EEC.

An efficient smaller community could then be set up, unhampered by tiresome partners who are reluctant to play their part.

But this is not a realistic ... The future of Western Europe look gloomy were it not for ... which is essential to safeguard ... racy and peace.

Common Market countries ... favour of a united Europe ... be go ahead without those ... ther unwilling or, as yet, unable.

Spending Common Market ... the former is a waste, whereas ... will badly need assistance.

The EEC must stop being ... a halt by countries that are not ... terested in it. Willy Brandt was ... with consternation and outrage ... made this point 10 years ago ... union conference in Paris. He ... then and still is. *Hermann ...*

(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 2 Sept...)

Soviet rea...

Continued from page ...

Soviet air space seems proba... tes. A Paris newspaper which ... that a nation was now ... mask and revealing its true real character, that of a bandit ... well overshot the mark.

So do American politicians clamouring for the toughest ... such as calling off the Geneva talks, and possibly recall ... by President Reagan in his ... office.

"The Soviet Union," he ... and deceives wherever it can."

The presence of mind by ... ry of State Shultz has been ... He has no intention of acting ... und skipping the final meeting ... drid, including talks with Mr ...

He feels it is even more ... this stage to maintain ties with ... viet Foreign Minister and ... has to say about the incident ... consequences for East-West ...

The explanations Moscow ... not the excuses) will determine ... the United States sees any ... final document at Madrid ... cuse been most reluctant to ...

It will also determine ... crucial round of Geneva ... stands even the slightest ... reaching agreement.

Visions of a Soviet missile ... un unarmed commercial airliner ... alarmingly symbolic as those ... nuclear submarines patrolling ... coastal waters.

How can Moscow hope ... such visions from the minds ... at the Geneva conference table ... sewhere? What possible ... building measures can have ... ed effect? *Heinz ...*

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, ...)

The German Tribune

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HOME AFFAIRS

The Chancellor returns to command post

Chancellor Helmut Kohl has ended his holiday and returned to Bonn at the helm. But he has said nothing about the course he intends to steer. ... might have put an end to the constant public tug-of-war, but the problems remain.

... dispute, which dealt with important issues, kept going because there was nobody to give direction.

Problems between the CSU and FDP are likely to continue because the FDP needs contrast and conflict to demonstrate the need for a liberal party.

The dispute always has the same ... the coalition government has to ... how much liberalism it is prepared to permit, it doesn't matter whether ... issues as the right of assembly ... policy towards foreigners.

... dispute over the maximum age ... workers' children may come to ... has been going on for years ... finally be settled. (The conservatives want it to be reduced from the ... 16 to six years).

... CDU brass has finally settled the ... of the motherhood allowance ... for working mothers will not ... tempted to balance the budget.

... the conflict on this issue is not ... The CDU wants to make up for ... cutbacks now by extending the cost-... allowance at a later date to include ... mothers, regardless whether they ... or not or whether they are needy.

... using such expensive social benefits should not serve as an example ... coming reform of the government's family affairs policy, i. e. child ... allowances, tax splitting for couples ... non-taxable portions of income.

... would be wrong to minimise the ... importance of list of points and proposals by Lower Saxony's Prime Minister, ... Albrecht, CDU (See story this ... —Ed).

... they indicate the growing concern in ... and CSU ranks that the economic ... is far from ensured, despite ... to the contrary.

... economic growth has so far had no ... on unemployment, and Albrecht ... asks what will happen if industry ... becomes more automatised.

... any event, the government has still ... tackle the structural problems of the ... economy. In the autumn, it ... have to decide whether to shut ... several coal mines or allow huge ... piles to grow further.

... steel industry will have to reduce ... But the question here is: ...

... major shipyards have already ... for how long Bonn intends to ... the building of unnecessary ...

... of thousands of jobs are at stake ... industries. If Bonn decides to ... the ailing industries going it will ... able to reduce its borrowing. And ... discontinues the financing of unprofitable jobs, the legion of jobless and ... money problems of the social security ... will grow.

... are different approaches to the ... problems in the offing: the ... Democrats want government job ... programmes to boost sagging demand. The conservatives want drastic cutbacks in the social security system and tax relief for business to provide industry with more scope.

So far, the government has steered a middle-of-the-road course. It is trying to prevent any abrupt changes and balance the budget gradually by reducing social security spending and tightening the system.

But this gingerly approach will not cause a quick upturn.

There are also other trouble spots. Bonn has to cut back surplus agricultural production because the EEC cannot pay. But it also must ensure the livelihood of Germany's farmers.

The destruction of forests demands new measures that will cost both business and the consumer.

Kohl will have to come up with an extraordinary programme.

There is, of course, no reason why he should do everything himself. He should make his team pull up their socks.

He should resist his inclination to procrastinate on difficult decisions unless everybody agrees to them.

There is a tough autumn ahead.

Wolfgang Mauersberg

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 29 August 1983)

Olive branch waved in the coalition

Bonn Economic Affairs Minister Count Lambsdorff (FDP) has announced that he is prepared to make a reconciliation with his opponent, CSU leader Franz Josef Strauss.

However he is not only wise but crafty as well. The date on which he will be ready to take this step is the evening of 25 September, election day in Hesse and Bremen.

This also reveals what triggered the dispute.

Count Lambsdorff is bothered that his image in the media has been declining since he became part of the CDU/CSU government.

Strauss keeps telling the voters that Count Lambsdorff is not only redundant but that he is responsible for a number of economic policy blunders.

The bone of contention between the two men is not so much different views but considerations of power politics.

Strauss's advice to Walter Wallmann, the CDU candidate for the premiership of Hesse, that he enter into a grand coalition with the SPD, is tantamount to ignoring the existence of the FDP.

Strauss was deliberately vague in his prediction that the world would soon stop revolving around Count Lambsdorff. This was evidently a reference to the Flick affair (involving party donations).

Strauss would have been wise not to have made the remark since he was unable to elaborate on it.

If the Chancellor were not anyway determined to keep Count Lambsdorff in his cabinet, Strauss's remarks would make him do so.

The FDP minister is extremely valuable to Kohl and his CDU because of his proxy function in fighting it out with the CSU.

He can drop this function once the FDP — with Strauss's able though unwitting support — manages to return to the State assembly in Hesse.

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 31 August 1983)

Recipe for economic cure gets cold reception

SüddeutscheZeitung

There has been opposition on both sides of the political spectrum to economic and social policy proposals by the CDU Prime Minister of Lower Saxony, Ernst Albrecht.

Albrecht wants, among other things, to fight unemployment by giving tax relief for business and increasing value added tax to make up the financial deficit.

Objectors include Bonn Labour Minister Norbert Blüm, the mayor of Frankfurt, Walter Wallmann (CDU), and the Bavarian Finance Minister, Max Streibl (CSU).

According to Associated Press, Blüm said workers should be given the tax relief, it was they who were bearing the brunt of austerity measures.

Income tax had risen twice as fast as pay increases. If this continued, the unions would be forced to make unreasonable wage demands.

The German news agency dpa reports that Bonn Finance Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg (CDU) will oppose the proposals and work towards lower income tax.

Streibl has suggested the introduction of a tax-free portion of salaries as soon as 1985/86.

Albrecht's 10 points are: 1 Government measures have not been enough to achieve a sustained upturn and reduce unemployment.

2 The psychological upswing the change of government caused in the business community is waning. Genuine economic measures are needed.

3 The rise in unemployment has many causes including to small returns on investment and too high wages. The social security costs to be borne by employers have made labour costs even higher and reduced profits still further.


As a result, liquidity has diminished drastically and the volume of investments is commensurately lower.

Business has lost its ability to respond quickly and adequately to changed conditions. Some examples of managerial lack of flexibility: Companies find themselves in trouble because the social provisions that have to be made prevent the shut-down of individual production plants.

Legal handicap

Legal provisions to prevent the dismissal of staff lead to overtime rather than new hiring. The co-determination provisions have bureaucratised managerial decisions, favouring the preservation of obsolete structures.

Youth protection regulations make it more difficult to place apprentices. Before an industry can be established in a particular site it has to wade through a maze of red tape. Administrative courts contribute their share to the delay of possible investments. Labour has become too expensive, especially due to



Ernst Albrecht . . . panacea.

(Photo: Marianne von der Lancken)

non-wage costs. The social system is expensive and uneconomical, imposing a heavy burden on employers. The unemployment problem is aggravated further because the yardstick used in financing the social security system is usually based on the labour factor.

4 Tax on business must be reduced noticeably (by about 20 per cent). The suggestion that profits ploughed back into business be given more tax relief than those that are withdrawn should be seriously considered.

Tax priority

5 Cuts in income tax would be helpful. If simultaneous tax relief for business and labour puts too much of a strain on the budget, priority must be given to business in the interests of reducing unemployment.

6 Reduced overall tax revenues would be unrealistic in the next four years. The tax relief for business would therefore have to be offset by increased VAT and various sales taxes.

7 Labour costs must come down in real terms. Among the ways of achieving this are: reduced absenteeism, lower health insurance contributions by strengthening the interest of the insured in the thrifty use of funds and the uncoupling of the social net financing from work contracts.

8 The social burdens of economic adaptation processes must be borne primarily by the public. The financial and administrative hurdles for people wanting to go into business — especially the small and medium sized variety — must be removed.

9 Everybody has a right to meaningful work; but not everybody can have a highly paid job. The discussion over the benefits and dangers of shorter working lives and working hours should soon lead to specific action. More flexibility is equally important.

10 The distribution mechanisms are in need of a sweeping review. The enormous national product created in factories must be justly distributed. It is doubtful whether wages alone can do this. In any event, capital participation by the staff and later by the nation as a whole must become an important social task.

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 1 September 1983)

Asylum applicant jumps to death from courtroom

Kemal Altun, a 23-year-old Turkish applicant for political asylum, committed suicide by jumping out of the sixth-floor window of a West Berlin court.

Proceedings were about to start on the second day of an administrative court case to decide whether or not he should be deported. He ran to the open window as soon as the police had unlocked his handcuffs, jumped out and landed on the grass behind the court building. He died almost immediately.

He felt his powers of concentration were declining. "Kemal Altun was scared," his lawyer said. He did not trust the legal system in Turkey and was afraid of being tortured in custody there.

Time and again he insisted that the Turkish authorities wanted him for political reasons and not in connection with a criminal offence.

The Ankara police were interested in information about his brother, a former Social Democratic MP who was now living in exile in Paris.

Right-wing political opponents had constantly accused him of being involved in the murder of a former Turkish Cabinet Minister who has been a leading Nationalist politician.

The politician's family and friends were so powerful, Altun repeatedly told his lawyer, that they could even have taken the law into their own hands.

The case was extremely complicated in its legal ramifications. Altun arrived in West Berlin illegally in January 1981. Two sisters of his lived in the Berlin borough of Kreuzberg.

Eight months later he applied for asylum and an alien's passport. He said he couldn't apply to the Turkish consulate because his name was on the wanted list for political offences.

He was accused of having helped to set up a left-wing students' association and wrongfully accused of having been associated with the murder of a former Turkish Cabinet Minister.

A warrant for his arrest on charges of incitement to murder was issued by a military court in Ankara on 18 May 1982.

After the German authorities made enquiries in the Turkish capital an extradition request was made, but not in connection with the murder charge.

That would not have led to extradition because Altun would have faced a possible death penalty in his native country.

Instead the extradition request was made in connection with charges of trying to interfere with the course of justice.

Altun was said to have hidden the murderers and destroyed evidence, he was then taken into custody in Berlin.

When a local court ruled that a deportation order was legal because there could be no question of political activities being involved he was imprisoned pending deportation on 9 September 1982.

This state of affairs was in no way changed when the Federal Refugees Office in Zirndorf, near Nuremberg, ruled that he was a bona fide applicant for political asylum.

Recognition as an asylum-seeker does not invariably rule out extradition. In this case, the asylum commissioner appointed by the Interior Ministry appealed against the ruling.

So that left the Berlin administrative court with the task of deciding whether Altun could be granted political asylum.

Kemal Altun stood a fair chance of not being extradited. Various organisations had spoken up in his favour.

Scrutiny of the Turkish extradition application had also, in connection with a Turkish court judgment, given rise to doubts whether the charges of trying to pervert justice were justified.

But Altun was clearly unaware of this.

dpa

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 31 August 1983)

Bureaucratic questions

Everyone is upset about the death of Kemal Altun, the young Turk who committed suicide by jumping out of a sixth-floor courtroom window in Berlin.

But expressions of regret have a hollow ring. How desperate he must have felt to have preferred suicide to living on in fear of being extradited to Turkey and handed over to the military regime in Ankara!

Altun, 23, had been in custody pending extradition for 13 months and was taken in handcuffs to the Berlin administrative court where his application for political asylum, already granted, was under review.

He had clearly lost all hope of justice and was just plain scared.

His case is now over but there will have to be repercussions, and not just a witchhunt for a culprit. In strictly legal terms there is no guilty party.

But the officials who handled the case are bound to wonder whether they might not have done better to show human feeling.

It was a case in which two Bonn government agencies were at legal loggerheads because the granting of political asylum by the department responsible was not to the liking of the commissioner appointed by Interior Minister Friedrich Zimmermann.

Did they really mean to set up the Altun case as a warning? Two courts reached contradictory decisions. Were they merely abiding by legal formalities?

The outcome was undeniably that an individual was unremittingly driven to destruction between the millstones of red tape and the legal machine.

Why is it that no-one in Bonn or Berlin saw fit to give Kemal Altun an assurance that he would not be extradited to Turkey until the authorities were absolutely convinced he would come to no harm?


If any such assurance had been given he would most likely still have been alive.

All that can, and must, now be done is to reconsider Bonn's tougher policy line on aliens, especially extradition proceedings to Turkey.

Turkey is a dictatorship where might prevails over human rights. There must be no repetition of the Altun case.

Hans Stollhans

(Lübecker Nachrichten, 31 August 1983)



Doubts raised about sense of extradition regulations

Kemal Altun, 23, lost his way in the jungle of the law at a point where no-one but a legal expert could possibly have found his way out of the maze of provisions.

Seeing no way out, he chose suicide rather than the uncertain outcome of his protracted legal bid to gain political asylum and avert extradition to Turkey.

What happened to him is dreadful and makes one wonder whether the law as it stands makes sense. Germans are upset and the international echo is sure to resound.

The Altun case was no longer a purely German affair. The UN high commissioner for refugees had intervened in Bonn in a bid to prevent Altun's extradition.

The case is such a tragic one that we must take care not to let our emotions run away with us. It must be seen against a background that poses virtually insuperable problems for Bonn, and not just Bonn.

● In 1949, when the right of asylum was incorporated in Article 16 of Basic Law for political refugees no-one could have anticipated the degree to which discrimination and persecution on political, racial and religious grounds was to snowball in so many countries all over the world.

At the end of last year 41,857 foreign nationals had been granted political asylum in the Federal Republic of Germany, while about 160,000 cases were pending.

● No-one in 1949 could have anticipated the degree to which the right of asylum was to be abused by aliens who were patently economic rather than political refugees.

● Something had to be done to stem the tide, it was generally agreed. Has Altun's suicide brought about a complete change in the situation?

One reaction has been to lay the blame for an undoubted human tragedy on members of the Bonn government. This line of argument must surely be dismissed without further ado.

A more valid point that could well be considered is whether, after years of tolerance, a feeling of growing impatience with aliens might not have arisen that could affect legal rulings.

There must certainly be a rethink about extraditing people to Turkey. Bonn is naturally bound by treaty provisions, but these agreements were reached at a time when there was a democratic government in power in Ankara.

Since the military take-over three years ago the legal groundwork may not have changed but the moral foundations of such agreements most definitely have.

Altun's death is a reminder to reappraise the terms on which business between Bonn and Ankara is conducted.

Claus-Dietrich Möhrke

(Rheinische Post, 31 August 1983)

Tragic and complex case... Altun

Suicide reve[als] case of leg[al] complexity

Bewilderment and dismay o[ver the] suicide of Kemal Altun ha[ve been] universal in Bonn, where s[imilar] statements have been made by [Go]vernment and Opposition spoke[smen].

His despairing resolve, it wa[s] agreed, could have been due to [the sub]jective impression of being cru[shed and] pulverised by the mills of Germ[an just]ice. The legal position was unc[ommonly] complex, consisting of both [the] asylum and extradition proceed[ings].

Bonn legislation passed last y[ear stip]ulates that decisions reached in [connec]tion with asylum proceedings m[ay not] be relevant to extradition proced[ure].

Someone who is ruled elig[ible for] political asylum can still be ex[tradited] in connection with general c[riminal] charges (as opposed to politic[al offen]ces).

Experts feel this provision le[aves the] door to manipulation wide op[en and] human rights organisations s[ee a se]rious risk of Bonn's legal arran[gements] on political asylum, which ar[e among] the most generous in the world[, being] increasingly undermined.

Kemal Altun had already be[en ack]nowledged as a bona fide appli[cant for] political asylum. The extraditio[n appli]cation made by the Turkish gove[rnment] was in connection with criminal [offen]ces he was said to have comm[itted in] his native country.

International agreements on [extradi]tion are based on the conditio[n that] people who are extradited can o[nly be] charged with the offences refer[red to in] the extradition order.

Germany has approved ext[radition] orders since the military take[-over in] Turkey in September 1980. The T[urkish] military authorities have subm[itted ap]plications in 156 cases.

Eighteen people were retu[rned to] Turkey under extradition whil[e] Jochen Vogel and Jürgen Sc[hmude,] both Social Democrats, were [Justice] Ministers in Bonn.

The remainder were cases o[n which] Hans Engelhard, the present Fre[e Dem]ocratic incumbent, had to reach [a deci]sion.

In no case have there as [yet] been rumours of torture of peop[le] extradited. Rumours have certai[nly] reached Bonn.

So the Bonn government has [acted] on the assumption that Turkey is

Continued on page 6

GERMANY

[N]uclear protest [m]ovement has uphill task

[Th]e "hot autumn" of anti-nuclear [p]rotests began in Mutlangen, Swa[bia, o]n 1 September as an anti-war de[monst]ration to commemorate the out[break] of World War II and to warn [agains]t disaster.

[But] the hope of being heard is unlike[ly. Th]e likelihood of agreement on dis[arma]ment or even arms control remains [remo]te. There is nothing to indicate that Geneva missiles talks will succeed.

[G]ermany is the centre of the most lu[natic] arsenal the world has ever seen. [The] hope that politicians can solve this, [the] most crucial of the world's prob[lem]s, has declined.

[C]DU politician Kurt Biedenkopf [say]s the world has manoeuvred itself [int]o a blind alley.

Protest is becoming stronger: Hein[rich] Albertz, a Protestant minister who [is a] former mayor of West Berlin, and [auth]ors Günter Grass and Heinrich [Böll] are taking part in a blockade of [Am]erican military installations. In tak[ing] this action they are breaking traffic [reg]ulations.

Albertz says: "Protest against wea[pon]s of mass destruction is more im[por]tant than traffic laws. What matters [her]e are the basic questions of legitima[cy an]d legality.

He believes that the German govern[me]nt does not have the power to app[ro]ve the deployment of missiles. He [say]s that opposition, including breaking [traf]fic laws, is therefore justified.

[B]ut this is a mistake that could have [far-]reaching consequences.

[Th]ere are many reasons to get angry [at] the cynical way in which politi[cian]s treat the disarmament issue. But [the]re is not a single convincing argu[me]nt to show that the two-track Nato [dec]ision (to deploy the new generation [of m]issiles if arms talks fail) and the [Bon]n government's adoption of it did [not] come about legally.

The opposite is demonstrably true. [The]re was no arbitrariness involved. All [deci]sions were made as part of a legal [pro]cess and legitimised publicly [thro]ugh elections.

Anybody who claims the opposite by pointing to opinion surveys makes at least two serious mistakes:

One: it compares a lawful decision with Weimar's problems. Weimar boiled down to Hitler's unfortunately successful attempt to use his legally attained powers to legitimise the destruction of the Constitution and the minorities protected by it.

This comparison is tantamount to minimising the events of the 1930s and discrediting the present, even if it is done unwittingly.

When work on the present Constitution began — also on a 1st of September, but 35 rather than 44 years ago — Carlo Schmid, one of the fathers of the Constitution, said that "the very term 'constitutional state' automatically entails the citizens' duty to obey that state's laws... This in no way detracts from their right to change their state and society, using the avenues given to them by the Constitution to this end."

Those who ignored this helped those who had long been arguing that the opponents of a traditional security policy were unable to use the demonstration laws. The laws it followed had to be tightened.

Two: the other major mistake is to attribute more importance to opinion polls than to a parliamentary democracy's ground rules. These rules have been adopted by the Federal Republic of Germany, which deliberately and expressly turned its back on the disastrous plebiscitary elements of the Weimar Constitution.

The present Constitution also clearly rejects Jacobinism, a system in which the alleged people's will is determined in small groups and taken as a binding political guideline.

The amazing fact is that many of the leading intellectuals of today's protest movement themselves suffered from the perversion of parliamentarism in the waning days of Germany's first democracy.

Should not they — more than anybody else — have the onus of demonstrating in favour of a renaissance of parliamentarism and parliamentary debate under democratic rules?

The dispute over whether the Bundestag should debate and evaluate the Geneva talks demonstrates a dangerous development.

The Bundestag must take its role as the nation's political forum more seriously once more and lead the discussion.

Walther Stützle

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 1 September 1983)

Judges reprimanded after anti-missiles stand

Thirty-five judges and prosecutors have been reprimanded after they put an advertisement in a newspaper declaring that they opposed the missile deployment.

The advertisement, in the conservative daily, *Lübecker Nachrichten*, said the deployment would violate the Constitution.

What makes this action unusual is the fact that the Lübeck judiciary has never had the reputation of being particularly rebellious.

On the contrary, it has always been regarded as a bastion of conservatism in Germany's northernmost state where many years of CDU government have rubbed off on it.

Schleswig-Holstein's Justice Minister, Henning Schwarz, responded as expected. Ministry spokesmen said the 35 could be disciplined.

The minister obtained a legal opinion and Lübeck Presiding Judge Herbert Tietgen told the 35 that they were in breach of their duties as civil servants.

They received a written reprimand which has become a permanent part of their personnel files. The reprimand concerns the manner in which the advertisement was presented, especially the fact that they identified themselves as "judges and prosecutors" and referred to their "professional ethics," this jeopardising the reputation of the judiciary.

It is true that the law demands that civil servants exercise "moderation and restraint" in political matters. But views differ widely on how this is to be interpreted in each case.

According to the signatories, their advertisement does not violate the civil service code because the mention of their professions was kept in generalterms and was indispensable for the understanding of the advertisement.

After all, the advertisement put forward legal arguments such as these, the signatories say:

● The deployment of new weapons without a law to this effect is unconstitutional;

● The new weapons endanger the constitutional right to physical inviolability and increase the "danger to our lives manifold." In times of tension, the Soviet Union could be goaded into a preventive nuclear attack on West Germany, and the danger of a nuclear war due to technical failure is being promoted in an "insufferable way."

● The fact that the president of the USA can decide on the use of new weapons without consulting German authorities is incompatible with the Constitution.

The Lübeck 35 are not alone with their reservations.

Even so, the Kiel Justice Ministry wasted no time in taking action. The reprimand they received has a political dimension as well: it not only weighed the signatories' actions; it also wanted to present the official government definition of "state interests."

The fact that the Schleswig-Holstein government is not dragging its feet when it comes to taking preventive action against the "hot autumn" is demonstrated by yet another Lübeck case;

Prosecutors and police recently searched the premises of the leftist student union, generally known by its acronym ASTA, at the Lübeck Medical School. The police confiscated several copies of the student paper *Springender Punkt*.

The paper urged its readers to participate in blockades of US military installations and direct action in the Bremerhaven region. An official investigation by the prosecutors has begun.

The *Lübecker Nachrichten*, which carried the advertisement, distanced itself from it in that very issue, writing: "This advertisement will serve as a welcome whitewash for all demonstrators who believe that they can ignore the law on grounds of conscience."

Where Lübeck is concerned, the hot autumn has already begun.

Karsten Plog

(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, 21 August 1983)

Continued from page 4

ing by its promises, it being in Ankara's interest to do so.

"They know for sure that we would stop extraditing people immediately if anyone who was returned was tortured in Turkey," a Justice Ministry official comments.

At a time when the Altun case was not widely publicised the authorities in Bonn gave his Berlin lawyer an assurance that he would be allowed sufficient time to arrange for defence witnesses to be summonsed from Turkey.

He was also given to understand that after the public debate in connection with the Altun case his client was unlikely to be extradited.

Yet that would have been an equally unsatisfactory state of affairs from the legal viewpoint. Why should one man not be extradited when others had been? Surely that would be a breach of the principle of equality.

Bonn even has an interest in abiding by extradition procedures in ties with Turkey. It is an interest that derives from the principle of reciprocity.

There are regular instances of German citizens imprisoned in Turkey who are wanted in Germany for, say, drug running offences.

Turkey would be unlikely to extradite them if Germany stopped extraditing Turks. So there is more to the problem than meets the eye.

Rolf Clement

(Mannheimer Morgen, 31 August 1983)

Councils rebel over arms deployment

[T]he State of Bavaria is involved in a battle with some of its local coun[cils] over nuclear weapons.

[O]ne of the rebel councils the city of [Lin]dau. It passed last year a resolution [aga]inst the storing and transport of nu[clea]r weapons.

[T]he district council, a senior authori[ty, a]sked the city to cancel the resolu[tion] on the grounds that it did not have [the p]ower to pass it.

[L]indau city refused. So the district [cou]nded it by decree. The city appeal[ed] to a higher local government autho[rity].

[T]hat was rejected, but with the com[me]nt that Lindau could take the matter [to] court if it wanted to.

[T]he cities of Nuremberg and Erlan[gen] have also rejected the stationing of [nu]clear weapons within their bounda[ries]. Their disputes have not yet reach[ed] the courts.

[T]he central Franconia authority has [no]w demanded that the two reverse their resolutions. Otherwise it would be done by decree.

The small community of Eching, north of Munich, has also rebelled.

The state of Bavaria's efforts to make the municipalities give in peacefully have been successful only in the case of Munich, which adopted a similar resolution last year and then reversed it.

The State has always stressed that the laws governing municipalities give them no right to decide on defence issues. Only the Federal government could.

Under Bavarian law, town councils are administrative bodies rather than parliaments with a governing party and an opposition, says the State. They are therefore not authorised to make decisions of far-reaching political significance.

A municipality only had the right to interfere in matters that concern planning and zoning and the like.


In such cases, however, municipal action would have to be based on concrete plans — which was not the case either in Lindau or in the other municipalities whose representatives oppose the stationing of the weapons as a mere "precaution against an eventuality."

In support of its line of argument, the state cites two constitutional court rulings passed in 1958.

The rulings nullified Hamburg and Bremen laws on an opinion survey on the nuclear weapons issue and called on the state of Hesse to take action against municipalities intending to conduct such polls on their own.

The state of Bavaria particularly stresses that the court rulings restrict the activities of municipal councils to local affairs.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 20 August 1983)



The Great Government Handout keeps doling out the cash

Federal handouts, including subsidies for industry, are constantly increasing despite declarations that they should be reduced.

The Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, said in August last year when he was Leader of the Opposition, that subsidies should be cut by a specific across-the-board percentage.

Heiner Geissler, now the Minister for Youth, Family Affairs and Health, said in July last year when he was an Opposition spokesman, that financial assistance and subsidies should be cut by five or 10 per cent.

They were words that sounded good then. But they have been forgotten.

Figures now issued show that payments by the Federal government, including tax relief, have risen from DM27.2bn in 1982 to DM28.6bn this year. Next year they are likely to reach DM29bn. But they are vastly understated.

The figures are in a Subsidies Report which the government must present every two years to let the public know how much money is being handed out and to whom.

However, they are selective. They deal with only about a third of the volume of handouts.

One salient omission is the Federal railway, the Bundesbahn. It is getting DM14bn this year, but it gets no mention in the report. Nor do farm subsidies, in the form of excessive produce prices.

Other omissions are State benefits such as child allowances, education subsidies and supplementary pension payments.

A more realistic figure for the overall volume of Federal, state and municipal subsidies plus the nation's share in EEC subsidies would be in the region of DM80bn to DM90bn.

Everybody has his hand out: farmers, people building homes, tax relief acrobats, visitors to Berlin, steelmakers, the mines, skipyards, aircraft manufacturers, computer makers, the coastal regions, fishermen . . .

Almost two-thirds of West Germany's territory has been declared as being entitled to subsidies under the structural policy of Bonn and the *Länder*. And especially at election time politicians tend to discover their "structural hearts".

Subsidies are addictive. Granting them is easy. Cutting them off is hard, as is shown by such major recipients as the Bundesbahn, farmers and the coalmining industry.

They have been beneficiaries for decades and yet they are further from solving their structural problems than ever before.

The Bundesbahn is on the verge of financial collapse and the farm subsidies could easily break the EEC bank. The coalmining industry is in the throes of its worst post-war crisis.

The past few years have seen branches of industry that previously weathered hard times on their own drawn into the subsidies vortex, including steelmakers and shipbuilders.

The reason for this is unscrupulous subsidising by our foreign competitors. This has led to unfair competition on international markets.

Italian, French, British and Belgian steelmakers alone received around DM80bn in subsidies from 1975 until 1982.

This has enabled them to sell steel on the German market at up to DM200 a ton less than German steel.

It is not surprising that German steelmakers have had to shut down some of their plant, which rank among the most modern in the world.

It is also not surprising that they are now calling for state help.

For Arbed-Saarstahl alone, subsidies by now amount to DM130,000 per job.

One subsidy leads to another. Whole branches of business are already at loggerheads with each other because one receives more than the other.

Non-subsidised companies consider themselves discriminated against because they have to compete with subsidised ones — whose subsidies they have to help finance through tax.

There is yet another danger inherent in subsidies: they amount to an indirect state guarantee of full employment, thus increasing the risk of excessive pay deals.

The parties to collective bargaining can shed their overall economic responsibility because the state foots the bill for the economic consequence of excessive pay deals.

Subsidies can make sense, but they can also be stupid. They can be help towards self-help or towards lethargy.

The latter seems to prevail. Billions of the taxpayers' money go into unsound investments and help perpetuate obsolete plants or delay adaptation processes.

They lead to a quasi "state controlled economy," as Otto Wolff von Amerongen, president of the standing chamber of commerce and industry (DIHT), puts it. And all this ostensibly for the sake of securing jobs, which is an illusion in the long run.

Once the state finds itself unable to raise the money needed for the subsidies the company that had been artificially kept alive for years will have to throw in the towel or be modernised with the help of belated subsidies. Both of which cost jobs.

Excess production capacity created with government help reduce profits in the neighbouring countries. This means that subsidising states export their own unemployment to countries that still uphold the principle of free enterprise.

This was experienced not only by Germany's steelmakers and shipyards but also by the man-made fibre industry.

Years of subsidising the Italian fibre industry thus forced German fibremakers to drastically cut down their own production.

A prime example of the unfair competition and social injustice caused by subsidies is the German housing business which guzzles up an annual DM20bn in state benefits.

The housing market remains politically explosive. The flood of money that goes into housing bypasses such social problem groups as large or broken families, pensioners, the disabled and the homeless.

In millions of cases these social underdogs contribute to the well-being of the wealthy with their tax payments.

The taxpayer thus finances a considerable part of the billions worth of assets amassed by housing companies.

To say that there is a shortage of one million housing units does ... the government's subsidising ...

It is easy to fabricate any shortfall, be it 500,000 or two million.

There are no reliable yardsticks which to measure genuine needs because state intervention in the housing business keeps falsifying the position.

By keeping the cost of house construction and rents down, the state creates an artificial demand.

But this demand does not indicate a shortage. It only indicates that there are not enough low-cost apartments.

What can be done? DIHT recommends across-the-board cutbacks of subsidies by a uniform percentage.

But this would be only the first step. The next step would be to put a time limit on all subsidies.

Once the time has run out — this would be the third step — a parliamentary committee would assess the necessity of continuing individual subsidies.

This is a favourable moment to implement this: there is no public ... and there is heavy pressure on politicians to economise. There is a spectacular example to go by: ... land has opted for an across-the-board ten per cent cut in subsidies.

Why is Bonn hesitating? Is the Finance Minister afraid of the reaction of the chief executives of the major ... rally owned companies?

The government should not be deterred from reducing the subsidies because other countries continue the practice, says DIHT.

Defensive subsidies would ... the world-wide protectionism ... ther. The obvious solution is ... to hit subsidised imports with ... though this would be the end ... trade, DIHT says.

A survey among young business ... has come up with a revealing ... per cent of those who receive ... said that they would have carried ... their business plans even without ...

Heinrich ...

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ ... 26 Au...)

Ship-building crisis: 'room for confusion'

Bonn and the coastal *Länder* disagree on how serious the crisis in the shipbuilding industry is. But it has been suggested that much of the dispute is because of a difference in interpreting data.

Dr Frank Haller, head of the Bremen committee for economic research (BAW), calls for a careful analysis of shipbuilding information. He says that in no other industry is so much confusion caused by statistics about orders and deliveries.

But new scientific methods of statistical analysis can provide reliable results; and these results show that Germany's shipbuilding industry is considerably more threatened today than it was in 1978 when the export subsidies programme (now ended) was prepared.

The comparative BAW shipbuilding analysis includes the global state of the industry because shipbuilding cannot be viewed in isolation. These are the conclusions:

Worldwide orders in 1982 declined 35 per cent against the previous year, though they exceeded the 1978 level by 40 per cent.

In the first months of 1983 there was a decline.

In the second quarter a mammoth order (predominantly from Japanese yards) improved the statistical picture.

The second quarter of this year saw orders for more than eight million deadweight tons go to Japanese yards.

By comparison, German yards received orders for slightly more than 70,000 tons, less than one per cent of the Japanese orders.

The tonnage of mothballed vessels has reached a new record with more than 45 million gross registered tons. This means that today's mothballed tonnage is 60 per cent higher than in 1978, the previous record year.

What is particularly disastrous for Europe's shipbuilding nations is the drastically changed structure of the mothballed tonnage since 1978.

Today, there are some 15 million GRT non-tanker vessels mothballed (as against four million GRT in 1978). This imposes a particularly severe burden on builders of special vessels, a field in which the Western industrial nations have been trying to specialise.

While the world shipbuilding industry is marked not only by risks but also some bright spots, the present order book situation of German yards confronts the industry with grave problems, according to BAW.

The volume of orders today is 20 per cent lower than in 1978. Changes for the worse in 1983 become ... obvious when seen in the light of ... vious developments:

In 1978, orders rose 44 per ... against the previous year; in the ... half of 1983, they dropped 44 per ... against the same period a year ...

Orders from foreign buyers ... clined particularly sharply. The ... today 48 per cent below the 1978 ...

After the expiry in 1981 of the ... subsidies programme, foreign ... dropped 62 per cent — consid... more than the 23 per cent drop in ... mestic orders.

Only one foreign order from the ... dustrial world for a vessel of 100 ... has come in so far this year.

BAW: "This shows that the ties between German yards and the ship... companies of the Western industrial ... tions are now severed."

In view of this, BAW concludes ... the German yards' share of global ... building is clearly declining.

In 1982 it stood at 3.5 per cent, ... kedly below the 4.6 per cent of 1978.

Germany's share in the particularly interesting non-tanker sector dropped from 6.3 to 4.1 per cent in the ... period.

The basic data are thus considerably worse this year than they were in ... This is further aggravated by the ...

Continued on page 7

TRADE

...ow builds over rise in cost of export insurance

...ns to increase sharply the cost of ...suring exports against payment ...ts have come under heavy criti... both by industry and in Bonn.

...s believed that export insurance ...ums will rise by between 35 and ... cent, with some firms having to ... to 80 per cent more.

... spokesman for industry says the ...als are based on unrealistic figu...

...n criticism is that costs for indus... ...ll increase and that jobs will be ...

...vernment export insurance is ...led by the Hamburg-based Hermes ...any. It has been in the business ...0 years.

... aim is to protect exporters from ...in other countries. Because Bonn ... not want to use subsidies to un...rite payments, as is done in some ...ern countries, Hermes has to char... premiums. It is therefore a genuine ...ance company.

...e premium for an average deal ... a five-year cover amounts to bet... 2.3 and four per cent of the sale.

...e insurance covers economic risks ... political hazards like war or natio... bankruptcy.

...t the premium does not secure full ... Hermes pays the exporter 85 per ... of the invoice amount in case of ... buyer's insolvency and 90 per cent ... case of default due to political rea...

...rmes terms are, compared with the ... promotion of other industrial ...ns, not attractive. As a result, many ...rters do not take out state cover.

...nly nine per cent of German ex... are insured, compared with 30 to ... per cent for France, Britain and ...n.

...t all exporters even qualify. A deal ... to be considered "worthy of promo...

...e details of the relevant provisions, ...h are wide open to interpretation, ... been worked out by the Inter-Mi...rial Committee (IMA) in which ministries, industry and the trade unions jointly decide what is to be insured.

Federal export guarantees (billion DM)		
Country	1982	1978
Saudi Arabia	21.7	20.3
Soviet Union	15.0	8.4
Libya	13.4	5.9
Iraq	10.6	2.0
Brazil	9.9	9.4
Nigeria	8.5	5.4
Algeria	7.5	7.6
South Africa	6.3	2.8
Poland	5.8	8.5
Iran	5.4	6.4
Indonesia	4.8	2.0
Argentina	3.8	1.9
China	3.0	2.8
Egypt	2.5	1.0
Yugoslavia	2.2	2.0
Greece	1.9	1.8
Turkey	1.9	1.8
Spain	1.6	1.6
India	1.6	0.5
United Arab Emirates	1.5	1.3
Total	150.3	112.8

No guarantee may be issued if default is predictable. But even here Bonn has always proved flexible.

If a business partner who has generally been sound is suddenly faced with a crisis Bonn does not loudly announce that exports to that country will no longer be guaranteed.

The course of action in such cases is to procrastinate.

Bonn even went so far as to change the cash deals of German construction companies into credit deals when the Iraqis discontinued cash payments after thier war with Iran started.

Bonn guarantees export deals worth about DM150bn. Most of this federal commitment is accounted for by the Third World where 34 per cent of German exports carry insurance cover.

The present total coverage here is about DM75bn, half of which is accounted for by the Opec countries.

The East Bloc countries account for about 15 per cent. The rest is accounted for by the Western industrial nations and others.

Most of Germany's exports are plant and machinery: 44 per cent of Hermes business in 1982.

The construction industry ranks second with just under 18 per cent, followed by road vehicles, ships and aircraft (13 per cent) and electrical and precision goods (11 per cent).

The rest is accounted for by iron, sheet metal and pipes (just under eight per cent) and miscellaneous (just under seven per cent).

The growing number of crisis areas in the world, the general economic situation and the near insolvencies of many countries have led to a rise in claims and Bonn has had to honour its guarantees.

This year is expected to close with a loss of about DM1bn, which will almost eat up the DM1.3bn in earnings achieved so far.

Since both Finance Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg and Economic Affairs Minister Count Lambsdorff expect future losses of DM1bn a year it has been decided to increase the premiums.

The envisaged increase is said to be between 35 and 50 per cent, which means that about DM350m of the anticipated DM1bn deficit will be paid by industry.

But some branches of business must expect to be hit harder than others.

Plant and machinery, for instance, is likely to have its premiums raised by up to 80 per cent.

According to the Association of German Plant and Machinery Industry (VDMA), this will add three per cent to sales prices, which is more than the profit margin, as a VDMA spokesman puts it.

VDMA general manager Justus Fürstenau fears that the industry, already hard hit by the drop in exports, will find itself in trouble.

"How can Bonn raise the premiums at a time when export promotion is more necessary than at any other moment in the past 20 years if it really wants to bring about an upturn? I can only ask myself if Bonn hasn't been too hasty."

Experts at the standing council of German chambers of commerce and industry (DIHT) and the Federation of German Industry (BDI) are as much at a loss to understand why Bonn is raising the premium immediately after the first year of Hermes losses following years of profitable operation.

Gieseke: "To raise the premiums now that we have export problems anyway is psychologically as wrong as can be."

These industrial organisations are by no means interested in subsidies. They simply deny that there is any need for premium increases, saying that Bonn operates with wrong figures.

Gieseke: "The figures that have been presented to us are based on a purely statistical and budgetary line of thought. They're not realistic."

Experience so far showed that even countries that appeared hopelessly insolvent at one time later paid up.

As a result, the German finance minister's liquidity problems were only temporary.

Gieseke: "If Bonn can concretely prove that the premium increase is necessary, we will agree to it. What we want is fair premiums."

Though Stoltenberg and Lambsdorff want to make the higher premiums palatable by speeding up the settlement of of claims, this is not enough. It has been long overdue anyway.

Up to now, the Stoltenberg has taken plenty of time to honour his guarantees. "Some companies have been waiting for a year and longer to get their money," says Fürstenau.

Industry is now urging BDI President Rolf Rodenstock to take the matter up with Chancellor Helmut Kohl himself.

Reservations are also increasingly being voiced in the Bundestag. Rudi Walter, chairman of the Bundestag Budget Committee, has told MPs to make sure that the insurance risks do not become too great.

But at the same time he warned against over-cautiousness that could endanger orders and hence jobs: "We'll have to ask ourselves how much this would cost in terms of unemployment benefits."

It could well happen that the Labour Office would have to pay more in dole money than the Treasury would collect in extra revenue from the increased premiums.

Fürstenau: "The premium increases could easily boomerang on Bonn."

Wolfgang Hoffmann

(Die Zeit, 26 August 1983)

Continued from page 6

... shipbuilding industry's decline in ...rts to other industrial countries.

...ll this makes it obvious that export ...idies are more sorely needed today ... they were in 1978.

...AW says subsidies are warranted ...use other shipbuilding nations in ... Western world grant much higher ...idies than Bonn and the coastal sta...

...e market share is determined not ...uch by economic factors as by sub...s. Any nation that opts out of the ...idies race prevents its industry from ...ing out an economically justified ...e of the market.

...o ensure the German shipbuilding ...stry's market share in the medium ..., it would also be necessary to ... technical productivity improve...ts and to lower production costs.

...nless the necessary crisis measures ... coupled with a productivity offen... ... Germany's already ailing yards ... be unable to weather the stiff com...tion on international markets, BAW ...ays.

(Bremer Nachrichten, 25 August 1983)

Decline in exports

German exports. First half-year figures (DM billions)

1978 139.7 · 1979 152.9 · 1980 176.3 · 1981 188.3 · 1982 215.9 · 1983 211.7

Foreign orders begin to decline again

German business is gloomy about export prospects for the next few months, according to a survey by *Die Welt*.

Exports dropped in the first half of this year by 1.9 per cent to DM211.7bn against the same period last year. But the main reason is the sluggish economic development in the most important buyer nations plus high interest rates and the indebtedness of some nations.

The capital goods and construction industries are particularly badly hit by declining foreign orders.

Some markets have almost completely dried up, particularly the Opec states. German shipments to Opec countries dropped 16.6 per cent to just under DM16bn.

This assessment is supported by the latest forecast of the HWWA Institute for Economic Research in Hamburg. After an export rise of 8.7 and 3.7 per cent (adjusted for inflation) in the past two years, the Institute predicts stagnation for the annual average of 1983 and a four per cent rise for 1984.

The economic development in the Western industrial nations (to which 78.7 per cent of German exports went in the first half of this year) will be decisive.

Sales here were 1.2 per cent below average. They amounted to DM166.6bn. Exports to EEC countries (share 49.3 per cent) cropped by 0.7 per cent.

Exports to France, Germany's most important buyer, declined 8.3 per cent to DM28.9bn. Even so, France accounted for 13.7 per cent of Germany's exports.

Exports to Britain rose 14.6 per cent to DM17.5bn (share: 8.3 per cent). Exports to the Netherlands were also up 4.2 per cent (DM18.5bn).

There was a particularly steep 36.5 per cent rise in the trade with Turkey (DM1.4bn).

The economic recovery in the USA generated only 0.2 per cent in extra exports.

Surprisingly, exports to the developing countries, excluding Opec, rose by 1.2 per cent despite the fact that shipments to Mexico and Brazil were down 56 and 24 per cent respectively.

Because of good business with the Soviet Union and China, exports to communist countries rose 11 per cent.

Hans-J. Mahnke

(Die Welt, 26 August 1983)

■ PERSPECTIVE

The nature of national image and identity



'Anything but a German'. That is a quote from a German named Alexis in John Le Carre's latest book, *The Little Drummer Girl.*

Espionage thrillers may not rate highly in literary prestige but a writer with the international reputation of a David Cornwell, alias John Le Carré, merits closer reading.

German readers may be taken aback to read that Alexis resolves to be a Jew or a Spaniard or an Eskimo or a root-and-branch anarchist like anyone else in his next life.

Anything, that is, but a German. That you only are once, for atonement, and that's it.

This is a viewpoint that can hardly fail to fascinate and irritate a German, although not particularly because it is expressed in a book that can be sure of selling a million.

The writer, David Cornwell, spent some years in Germany. He has a number of German friends and cannot be accused of being anti-German in outlook.

The main reason why his viewpoint is so disconcerting is that he has merely stated in a striking manner what people all over the world feel about us Germans *and some of us sometimes feel* ourselves.

Let no mistake be made about it regardless whether our French friends or American colleagues may be politely or even cordially prepared to grant one or other of us special status.

Many of us may feel complimented on being told we don't seem like Germans at all, but isn't that in itself an extremely telling comment?

We Germans ponder far too much over ourselved and are too keen on being loved, it is widely agreed, so we might just as well indulge in this national failing too.

Who, apart from J. R. Ewing, has never wanted to be loved? There are sound reasons, for that matter, why we should indulge in reflection on ourselves.

Many of us, like Dr Alexis, have an affinity with Spain: from the Legion Condor, which fought on Franco's side in the civil war, to the many who own a villa on the Costa Brava.

Maybe there is more to it than a desire for sunshine and reasonable prices; maybe not.

Would as many Germans like to be Jews as Jews enjoyed being Germans before the Holocaust? Probably not. It is certainly not a point that works particularly well.

As for Eskimos, they are merely a writer's gag used by le Carré.

And what about the Germans who would sooner be British or French or, if only the British and French would join them, Europeans?

A fact that is worth considering time and again is that there is no longer any such thing as a clearly-defined or generally-held concept of Germanness today.

Who among us would want to be a German for atonement when so many others around us are staunchly opposed to making amends?

Viewed historically, until 1871 there were no Germans; there were Bavarians, Badeners, Saxons, Prussians and many more.

A German national consciousness then began to take shape and, in typically German fashion, was wildly exaggerated, with the result that 1914 jingoism plummeted to zero in 1918.

The Weimar democracy was a second-rate democracy as a result of Versailles and nothing to be unduly proud of. Modern historians would do well to take a closer look at the extent to which Hitler and his aides benefited from the frustrated revival of national awareness.

The Nazi era marked the end, for a number of Germans, of their ability to identify with present-day Germany.

Most found themselves setting aside any feeling of being German as a result of the catastrophe of the Second World War and the dicatates of the Allies.

There is no such thing as a plaintive patriotism; it is a proud sentiment. Patriotism happens to be mere uncommon in Germany than in any other European country.

Viewed psychologically, we have no national identity with which anyone who in 1945 was only a child or not even born could identify.

The Federal Republic of Germany is, *all things considered, not a bad state.* It *may well* be the best Germany has ever had. But it lacks national identity.

It was easier, in the late 1940s, to feel a sense of national identity (and to cock a snook at the Allies) as a "native of Trizonesia," to quote a popular song of the era.

A German national identity would in all probability have been less problematic if the demarcation line between East and West had not split what was left of Germany down the middle.

But a united Germany consisting of the territory of the Federal Republic and the GDR would have faced trouble over the Nazi legacy, the lost Eastern territories and mistrust on the part of the superpowers.

It would also have been handicapped by what the world at large sees as the German national character. "Proud to be German" would be most unlikely to have been much fun.

As for what was left of Germany being divided, there is no point in crying over spilt milk, especially as fewer and fewer West Germans seem to care.

Over a year ago the Social and Free Democratic coalition in Bonn commissioned a survey of public opinion by Infratest, the market research organisation.

The Intra-German Affairs Ministry recently published its findings, the most striking of which was that fewer young people are interested in reunification.

About 20 per cent of the population as a whole are indifferent or opposed to reunification, but the proportion among 14- to 21-year-old is 40 per cent.

In other words, tomorrow's adult West Germans will be progressively less inclined to feel that Leipzig and Dresden are as much a part of Germany as, say, Frankfurt or Munich.

Young Germans feel themselves primarily to belong to their generation: clearly, understandably, ephemerally. For they may be determined to trust noone over 30 now, but where will they stand when they themselves are 40?

Solidarity among the young is deceptive because youth is so transitory.

Home in the wider sense is probably the strongest tie that is still left. Anyone in West Germany who feels proud will be proud of coming from Lake Constance or the North Sea, the Black Forest or the Rhineland, of being a Bavarian or from Hamburg.

The next rung in the ladder is missing. Few Germans are keen on the idea of the fatherland. Most would dismiss as laughable any idea of dying for Bonn.

There are worse views to take. We have become cosmopolitans, good at foreign languages and keener on foreign travel than just about anyone else.

Yet when we stop to think what being a German means nowadays, all that comes to mind are history, civilisation and language.

None are firm foundations. We are the heirs to Hitler's legacy whether we want to be or not, whereas many other names synonymous with German culture can hardly be claimed by the Federal Republic.

They include Mozart, an Austrian, Kafka, a Czech, and many others such as Luther, Goethe and Schiller whom we share (or compete for) with the GDR.

Even the common language can lead us to jump to conclusions to which the East Germans, Austrians and Swiss rightly object.

Oddly enough, few Germans feel the issue of national identity is particularly pressing. Most think of themselves in terms of their family and friends, neighbours and workmates.

We all have many foreign friends and have no strong feelings on spending our next lives as Eskimos or us Germans, especially as none of use feel there will be a next time.

A tinge of pathos is hard to avoid in connection with what we would like to see. Be that as it may, being German means to us retaining awareness of German science and the arts, keeping up the German language, keeping up and even loving our families and homes.

It also means aiming at a United States of Europe toward which we Germans have more to contribute than the cash contribution we continually seem called on to make.

What we have to offer is our renunciation, perhaps not an entirely voluntary renunciation, of a national consciousness.

Rodolf Walter Leonhardt

(Die Zeit, 2 September 1983)

Franco-Ge[...] solidarit[...]

Forty-eight per cent of t[...] feel the Federal Republic[...]ny is their best friend, while [...] of Germans return the comp[...]

But an even higher pro[...] West Germans, 77 per cent, [...] of place to the United States, [...]tain trails behind at 24 per cen[...]

A majority of French and [...] would like to see joint de[...] close political cooperation be[...] two countries.

These findings were poll[...] Germans and French and pu[...] the weekend supplement of t[...] daily newspaper *Le Figaro.*

Last April and May, 20 y[...] the Franco-German friends[...] 1,000 French and 1,237 Ger[...] 18s were interviewed by a Fr[...] ket research organisation.

The former French head of [...] Giscard d'Estaing felt the [...] showed that "a historic antag[...] been transformed in an over[...] manner into an expression of [...]ship."

He was surprised to learn th[...] French people polled tended [...] view America and Britain as the[...]try's best friends than their [...] counterparts, who were more [...] attracted to France than their [...]

Young people thus ran count[...] general trend.

Sixty-nine per cent of the Fr[...] 70 per cent of the Germans q[...] were in favour of a close politi[...] between the two countries.

He saw the fact that 66 pe[...] the French and 52 per cent of [...]mans questioned felt the other [...] would come to their assistanc[...] event of a Soviet attack testi[...] growing feeling of community [...]rity matters.

Yet France still had much t[...] persuade the Germans that i[...] help them in the event of a So[...]sion.

Dr Alois Mertes, Minister of [...] the Bonn Foreign Office, says th[...]cle of the 1950s and 1960s was [...]many's economic miracle. It [...] depth and solidarity characte[...] Franco-German friendship.

As for the German's prefere[...] the Americans, he says: "A lack [...]fidence in the United States on the [...]mans' part would be a risk for [...] and an opportunity for the [...] Union."

(Mannheimer Morgen, 20 Au[...])

The British cock a friendly eye towards Germany

Britain's best friend on the Continent is felt to be Germany, a Gallup poll published by the *Sunday Telegraph,* London, reveals.

The Federal Republic of Germany led the field with 27 per cent, followed by France with nine and the Netherlands with eight per cent.

All other countries polled less than two per cent.

In 1968 Germany was named by a mere 12 per cent in a similar poll. By 1977 its rating had increased to 25 per cent.

Lack of interest has arguably made the most headway over the p[...] years. In 1968 there were one i[...] don't knows; this time the prop[...] was one in two.


If for whatever reason they w[...] able to live in Britain, 16 per ce[...] those questioned would prefer to [...] France, 15 per cent in Switzerland[...] 14 per cent in Germany.

Asked where they would [...] spend an all-expenses-paid holida[...] per cent opted for Switzerland, [...] cent for France and 12 per cent [...] Federal Republic of Germany.

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 29 Augu[...])

THE ENVIRONMENT

Lead-free petrol certain, despite criticism



[...]n says it is standing by its decision to introduce lead-free petrol [...]86, despite criticism.

[...]nce and Italy, Germany's main [...]g partners, have no intention of [...]ing suit yet.

[...]ore the decision was taken, the [...] executive of Daimler-Benz, [...] Prinz, told shareholders at the annual meeting that Germany could not [...]d to go it alone.

[...]seems that he was wrong. A fort[...] later it was decided to make lead-[...] fuel mandatory for all new cars [...] 1986.

[...]w models will have to be fitted out [...] exhaust catalysts as clean-air devi[...]o help protect Germany's dying fo[...] from atmospheric pollution.

[...] Bonn the concept of a pilot project [...] pioneering experiment is preferred [...]ssibly annoying other members of [...] European Community by talking in [...]s of going it alone.

[...]t from January 1986 the Federal [...]public seems sure to be on its own. [...]ce and Italy, who are Germany's [...] trading partners, have no inten[...]of following suit just yet.

[...]oth feel they cannot afford to im[...] such a heavy economic burden on [...] domestic motor manufacturers, [...]panies who mostly make small cars. [...]talysts cost about DM1,000, and [...]llation would increase the cost of [...]models by about the same amount, [...]here are relative differences.

[...] Fiat Panda would be about 10 per [...] more expensive, whereas a Merce[...]00 would be less than four per cent [...]er.

[...]r Prinz seems to have misjudged the [...]n Interior Minister, Friedrich Zimmermann. He failed to take Dr Zimmer[...]n's flexibility into account.

[...]st spring, when Baden-Württem[...] Premier Lothar Späth flew a kite [...]e will be deciding in advance and in [...] long term by when fuel has to be [...]-free"), Dr Zimmermann said such [...]s were unrealistic.

[...]et now, with a suit filed at the Euro[...] Court of Justice by neighbouring [...]tries standing a fair chance of suc[...] (on grounds of impeding free [...]), Bonn insists that the decision to [...] ahead with lead-free fuel by 1986 is [...]vocable.

[...]he Bundestag and Bundesrat are to [...]rove the legislation, which has yet to [...] drafted in detail, this autumn.

[...]ut motorists need have no fear that [...]y might have to park up their cars at [...] French or Italian borders from [...]6.

[...]Neighbouring countries, even if they [...]'t follow completely in Bonn's [...]steps, are sure to sell lead-free fuel [...] areas where most German holiday[...]ers are to be found.

[...]o Dr Zimmermann has unquestion[...]y put France and Italy on the spot. [...]y idea of bypassing the sensitive ca[...]yst when leaded fuel is used can be [...]smissed.

This extra addition to the exhaust [...]system would make the conversion even [...]ore costly. It would also be a half-baked idea if ever there was one, to paraphrase Helmut Eberspächer, the managing director of a leading German exhaust manufacturer.

There would be too serious a risk of the motorist forgetting to switch over from one exhaust outlet to the other, and a mistake would ruin the catalyst.

Yet Herr Eberspächer is not complaining. "As a manufacturer I can hardly fail to be delighted," he says at the prospect of extra business.

His company has long supplied German motor manufacturers with clean air exhaust units for cars exported to the United States.

He has other than personal motives for welcoming the Bonn decision, he says. From the environmental viewpoint there can be nothing wrong with introducing lead-free fuel.

The German authorities are not unduly worried about reducing the 3,500 tons or so of lead pumped into the atmosphere annually via car exhausts.

Lead may be a hazard because of its effects on the human nervous system, but lead-free motor fuel is essential because otherwise the catalysts would clog up.

Only working catalysts can ensure that sulphur dioxyde and nitric oxide are not released into the atmosphere, and they seem sure to be partly to blame for trees dying.

But Herr Eberspächer doubts whether the new regulations will have any immediate effect on acid rain or the demise of trees.

Only two to two and a half million new cars a year will be required to have catalysts fitted.

That will leave about 25 million old cars that can't be converted and will still need to use leaded fuel.

It is sure to be 15 years or so before all cars in Germany use lead-free fuel.

(Der Tagesspiegel, 28 August 1983)

Catalyst for lead-free fuel. The two orbs, which are honey-combed and metal coated, filter the fuel. The container at left is the housing for the catalyst. (Photo: DEGUSSA)

A split-hull ship to mop up oil slicks on the high seas

Claus Lühring, shipyard-owner in Brake on the Weser, originally wanted to call his oil mop-up vessel the *Ölsau,* or Oil Sow.

But the Research and Technology Ministry in Bonn, which is footing 90 per cent of the bill for the prototype, objected.

The ship might be designed to do the dirty work of cleaning up oil slicks, but who was going to smash the bottle of bubbly over her bows with a name like that?

It might be memorable, but it was inappropriate. So the name chosen was *Thor,* short for twin-hull oil recovery vessel.

The twin-hull design was the brainchild of Claus Lühring and an employee of his, Ortwin Fries.

The *Thor* is split down the middle, all 35 metres of her, with the two halves attached merely by a kind of hinge at the stern.

The two halves of the hull open wide at the bow to mop oil up. They form an angle of up to 65 degrees and the twin bows are up to 35 metres apart.

The slick is caught in the V as the ship moves forward and pumped into its storage tanks. Water and oil are separated and the water pumped back overboard.

The ship was put through its paces north of Heligoland in the North Sea. The sea was choppy and there were waves of up to five feet.

The *Thor* mopped up 80 per cent of the oil pumped into the water for test purposes.

"Keen interest has been shown by all oil-producing countries," Herr Lühring says. They were interested even before the prototype was launched.

The ship has now been put through its paces and can be seen in Wilhelmshaven, Germany's North Sea oil terminal.

Interest was earlier generated by the hard work of an AEG executive who spent 1,000 hours of his spare time building a scale model of the ship.

It was a large scale model and radio-operated on 20 channels. The scale model's "maiden voyage" was filmed and copies of the film sent to likely customers.

One point that could not be shown in the film was that the *Thor* when wide open lies like a lame duck on the surface of the water.

She is quiet. The hull hardly rocks at all. And that is essential if the mop-up operation is to be successful.


The prototype is a 250-tonner and can take on board up to 170 cubic metres of oil in three hours. A mop-up vessel for use in heavy seas would need to be about 600 tons to work effectively.

Five 600-tonners, it is estimated, would be enough to protect the entire German coastline in the event of a major oil threat.

The Bonn Ministry has bankrolled R & D work on means of handling oil slicks ever since oil leaked into the North Sea from the Bravo rig in 1977.

Fourteen projects are currently backed. They are run by institutes, engineer-

Continued on page 10



The 'Thor' being put to its thirsty work.

(Photos: Die Welt/Lühring-Werft)

■ MINERALS

Drop in world metal prices no deterrent for prospectors

Prospecting for metal ores continues in Germany despite the decline in world market prices for metals of all kinds.

Gold and various non-ferrous metal ores and heavy spar are what prospectors hope to find.

But work is hampered by the provisions of the new *Mining Act*, which came into force *last year* and is by no means as handy as the tried and trusted regulations of yesteryear.


Prospectors are hard at work in Upper Franconia and the Bayerischer Wald, where a fresh look is being taken at deposits that have long been known to exist near Goldkronach.

Preussag of Hanover have set up an office in the area from which geochemical prospecting is concentrating on titanium, tin and gold.

Tin ore deposits near Rudolphstein, on the border between Bavaria and the GDR, have been found to be not worth working.

But the quest continues, with the emphasis on systematic screening of sediment in brooks and streams. Samples of sand are taken and analysed for the amount of titanium and tin they contain.

The aim is to find out where high ore counts indicate rich seams. Prospectors also pan for gold in the traditional manner, sending the washings in for labortory analysis.



Prospecting for gold in the Eisenberg area near Korbach in Hesse has failed to come up with results so far.

Decisions remain to be reached on prospecting for copper in the shale areas of central Germany.

The Federal Geoscience and Raw Materials Research Establishment in Hanover has for some time joined forces with the Hesse Soil Research Department in this particular quest.

They have done drilling in 33 locations to check where the copper shale extends from the Harz to the Spessart region and identified rich seams in several areas.

They include Ronshausen, near Bebra, and Marjoss, near Schlüchtern.

It is generally agreed that interesting copper ore seams are only to be found in areas where subsequent subterranean oxydation has affected the shale.

These areas are where prospectors are taking a particularly close look at the possibilities. Exciting discoveries in the Liegnitz region are likewise in a red rot area.

BP, Esso and the St Joe Corp., a mining company that mainly operates in the United States and works alongside Preussag in Germany, have all prospected in various areas.

BP and Esso have pulled out of the project; the St Joe Corp. is still drilling.

As matters stand it doesn't seem to easy to locate deposits worth mining. The must be at least several dozen million tons of ore with a metal count of at least 1.8 to 2 per cent of copper.

Another prospecting programme, the Rhenoherzynikum Project, is still at the basic research stage. At depths of between 250 and 450 metres near Brilon two different categories of ore have been located.

A further project that is still in its early days is the search for a second area of rich seams of copper, zinc and lead ore near the Rammelsberg in the Harz mountains.

The Rammelsberg has been mined for over 1,000 years. Scientists now know how its deposits took shape and the Hanover establishment has joined forces with the Lower Saxon Soil Research Department to drill at seven locations in the area.

The geological patterns unearthed are very similar to the Rammelsberg area. Geochemists are currently checking whether rich seams my be expected.

Preussag sees no reason yet to expect commercial exploitation to make sense. The likely strata are at depths of between 400 and 700 metres and the cost of drilling would be out of [...] tion to the likelihood of a [...]

There would need to be [...] mercial changes or more [...] scientific findings, or both, [...] covery of a second Rammels[...] more seriously envisaged.

In the Harz region Preus[...] concentrating on prospect[...] Rammelsberg area. In the [...] years existing deposits will be [...] ed, so every effort is being ma[...] extra seams to work out for [...] ger.

Wilhelm [...]
(Die Welt, [...])

Oil sucke[...]

Continued from page [...]

ing consultants and shipyards [...] gramme has a budget allo[...] DM22m.


The *Thor* is currently wor[...] bunker ship so as not to run [...] costs. Could she not be put to [...] in the Persian Gulf?

That would be superb sal[...] tion but the Lühring people d[...] idea. The oil leak from the [...] Gulf rig sinks quickly to the [...] the Iranian coast, they say.

What is washed up on the [...] of the Gulf states is bilge pum[...] board by tanker captains who [...] of a convenient opportunity [...] themselves of waste.

The strange but true fact is [...] *Thor* could only make headway [...] was an oil mishap off the [...] coast.

E. N[...]
(Die Welt, 30 [...])



■ BOOKS

Technology: librarians are not left on the shelf

[...]rarianship has the image of being [...] charmingly antiquated, not to say [...]lic job.

[...] technologies have changed all [...]

[...] printed word has long been join[...]by audiovisual media, magnetic [...] and computerisation.

[...]rarians, the 49th IFLA Congress [...]hich clearly showed, are having to [...] their trade.

[...]A stands for the International [...]ation of Library Associations and [...]utions. The motto of its Munich [...]ess was Libraries in a Technolo[...] Society.

[...]er 1,500 delegates from East and [...] spent six days discussing at 250 [...]sessions the specialised problems [...]n technology creates.

[...] her opening address IFLA presi[...] Else Granheim from Oslo said that [...] copying techniques and automatic [...] to data of various kinds present[...]ers with unprecedented new op[...]nities.

[...] they also gave rise to serious [...]ight problems to which a solution [...]be found that did justice to both [...]ders' rights and users' needs.

[...]he made further mention of the risk [...] information retrieval becoming in[...]singly commercialised.

[...]e result could well be a steadily [...]ning gap between those who need[...] information but were unable to pay [...] the privilege and those who were [...]set by financial difficulties.

[...] was evident in Munich that scienti[...]lly trained librarians had been join[...]by informatics specialists.

[...]enis Varloot of the French Interior [...]istry made the startling comment [...] it was high time society was envi[...]ed as managing without paper.

The new technologies would shortcircuit the information cycle by making immediate communication between producer and user possible.

Printed paper would thus degenerate to what was as a rule a merely temporarily valid by-product of complex electronic systems.

Professor Varloot appealed to fellow-librarians to set aside their view of themselves as "guardians of the grail."

Professor Werner Knopp, Berlin, did not share this pathos-laden view of the future. He felt technological euphoria should be scaled down to a realistic level.

While fully realising that new technologies saved space and manpower and made a much higher degree of extra-mural use of library facilities possible, he was well aware of the risks.

Their introduction was occasioned by objective requirements but total technologisation with the tendency to dispense with the book was much more accident-prone than the traditional system.

Technical hitches can only too easily affect the quality of services provided in respect of electronic transmission of literature without the user immediately realising the fact.

In the event of technical hitches, especially power cuts, electronic text retrieval would be impossible, while computer crime opens up the possibility of unprecedented deliberate eradication of facts on file.

Professor Knopp referred in particular to an aspect of new technology that was of great relevance to the individual information user

A new generation of specialists who relied on computer print-outs was increasingly coming to feel that the print-out was all there was to be said on a given subject.

Succumbing to the blandishments of computer convenience they tended to lose the facility to look up their own facts and put together and evaluate them.

The conclusion to which he came was that the advantages of traditional literary transmission ought to be retained and defended wherever they could without damage being done.

"What use is it if the soul of many written works falls by the wayside in the process?"

Rose-Marie Borngässer
(Die Welt, 27 August 1983)



Heinrich Böll . . . a winner again
(Photo: Süddeutscher Verlag)

[...]rankfurt fair sets record [...]efore opening

[...]ith six weeks to go to the opening [...] of the 35th Frankfurt book Fair [...] first record has been broken: 5,735 [...]lishers from 79 countries will be [...] from 12 to 17 October.

[...]ast year 5,688 publishers were repre[...]ed at the Frankfurt Book Fair.

[...]his year's total will include 1,522 [...]lishing houses from the Federal Re[...]lic of Germany.

[...]peakers at the official opening cere[...]ny, to be held on the evening of 11 [...]ober, will include EEC Commission [...]sident Gaston Thorn, Tübingen lite[...] historian Hans Mayer and Frank[...] mayor Walter Wallmann.

[...]he book fair is running a special ser[...] for publishers unable to book a [...]nd of their own. It is the Internatio[...]l Publishers' Centre.

[...]here will be no central topic this [...]r, but the fair will as always be ac[...]mpanied by a wide range of cultural [...]ents including a literary evening fea[...]ing writers reading selections from [...]ir work.

[...]hey will include writers from Brazil, [...]uadeloupe, Ghana, Kenya, Angola [...]d Cuba.

(Allgemeine Zeitung Mainz, 23 August 1983)

Dial-a-poem catches on, but not in every centre

Dial-a-poem was strictly an experiment when the scheme was launched in Kiel in September 1978. But the idea has spread to 12 parts of the country.

Deutsche Bundespost's taped poem or short prose facility is a four-minute sampler of literature for the price of a phone call.

Many will be surprised it has proved popular enough to survive alongside similar taped services such as the weather forecast, the lottery results and what's on at the cinema.

Work is read by the writer, a local person, who introduces himself and reads a four-minute selection of his poetry or prose.

The service is mostly maintained on the initiative of the local authority arts department as an attempt to confront people with literature who would not normally come into contact with it.

Other target groups include the sick, handicapped and blind, for whem the dial-a-poem facility is an opportunity of gaining access to the arts in their own homes.

The service was first introduced in Mainz, in December 1980. Münster, Düsseldorf, Hamburg and Lübeck followed in 1981. Last year they were joined by Stuttgart, Nuremberg and Osnabrück.

This year's newcomers have so far been Karlsruhe, Hagen and Ulm.

The Post Office keeps the service going as long as there are 1,000 calls a month which covers the costs. Dortmund and Mannheim failed to break even; their dial-a-poems have been discontinued.

Programmes, usually changed monthly, are compiled by the local authority arts department or by ad hoc groups.

The number of calls depends on how well-known the writer of the month is and how much publicity is given to the facility.

In Hamburg, for instance, there is an entry in the monthly arts programme. In Kiel the writer is featured in the local newspaper.

Many young writers see the facility as a welcome opportunity of getting their work across to a wider public.

In many cases they are allowed to mention their addresses so anyone who is interested can get in touch with them directly.

The arts, if they are to survive in an age that is far from well-disposed toward them, cannot afford to dispense with the new media.

Dial-a-poem is easy to use and anonymous. It could well promote interest in literature.

Dialling the number can also provide a moment's rest from the general pragmatic, businesslike atmosphere of our day and age.

Karl P. Aponer
(Die Welt, 17 August 1983)

Heinrich Böll tops poll of best-known German authors

Heinrich Böll is the best-known living German writer in Germany, the Allensbach opinion poll reports. But only a fraction of a per cent behind is best-selling novelist Johannes Mario Simmel. About 85 per cent of West Germans have heard of them both.

Writers ranging from Günter Grass to Alexandra Cordes were on the list pollsters presented to about 2,000 people.

Böll also topped an Allensbach poll in 1978.

He is particularly highly rated by 16- to 29-year-olds, which would seem to tally with the fact that 94 per cent of people who voted for the Greens, or environmentalists, had heard of him.

Simmel is best known among 30- to 44-year-olds, 91 per cent of whom have heard of him.

Günter Grass comes third, a rating he owes mainly to the men, 81 per cent of whom have heard of him. Only 71 per cent of women can place the name.

But his reputation is not the best. Unlike Böll, of whom one German in three had a good opinion, only 17 per cent of West Germans held Grass in high repute.

He too, interestingly enough, is challenged for popularity by a middle-brow, best-selling author, Heinz G. Konsalik. Nearly three quarters of the public have heard of Konsalik, who trails Grass by a mere two per cent.

Women writers such as Uta Danella and Christine Brückner are best known among women readers. Marie Louise Fischer, the best-known authoress, is known to 57 per cent of women but only 42 per cent of men.

It is intriguing to note that writers who are never given a mention by the critics are well known to many readers, whereas those whose names are constantly in the news on the review pages mean nothing to people with low educational qualifications.

Martin Walser, for instance, has been heard of by 11 per cent of Germans



with elementary education, whereas 39 per cent of people with higher education have heard of him.

Michael Ende, an imaginative writer of books for young people whose name is almost invariably at the top of the best-seller lists, is an even more striking example.


Only nine per cent of people with elementary education have heard of him, whereas his name means something to 29 per cent of people with higher education.

Eight per cent of the people questioned hadn't heard of any of the 14 writers listed, and one per cent (of the eight) were people with higher education.

In view of the writers listed this is a most upsetting finding.

Eva Klingenstein
(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 23 August 1983)

Criticism over plans for curbs on foreign students in Germany



Plans to introduce restrictions on foreign students in Germany and West Berlin have been heavily criticised by an educational organisation.

The plans include restricting length of stay and limiting choice of study.

DAAD, the German Academic Exchange Service, says the limitations are unnecessary, politically damaging and inept.

It says the eventual result will be to damage Germany economically and in foreign policy.

The recommendation is contained in a wide-ranging report on aliens policy presented to and passed by the Bonn government.

DAAD says fears about students staying beyond their time and damaging the German job market are based on inadequate information.

There are about 66,000 foreign students at universities in West Germany and West Berlin. About 36,000 of these are from developing countries.

Foreign students make up less than one per cent of the foreign population of West Germany and less than one per cent of the national student population, says DAAD.

DAAD is largely financed from public funds. It acts for Bonn, the *Land* governments and the universities abroad in education and culture. It promotes education and science in the Third World.

The report, whose recommendations are to be politically implemented by the Interior Ministry, operates on the assumption that the foreign students' stay is getting longer all the time and that many intend to stay permanently, says DAAD.

This would crowd the German job market and contradict development policy objectives.

As a result, the report recommended that the maximum stay be limited, depending on the course of studies, regardless of the stage a student had reached.

Exemptions might be granted in hardship cases, but even then the extension must not exceed two years.

DAAD says that the report's data are inadequate..

For instance, only 21,000 of the academics employed in Germany came from developing countries such as Greece and Turkey. According to DAAD, they got their jobs when Germany was short of trained university staff.

Today, the job market situation and the legal provisions governing aliens are different.

Length of foreigners' studies differed from case to case, as with German students.

There was no marked difference between the two groups. The careful selection methods applied to foreign students in the past few years had made the foreigners more successful in their studies, thus shortening their stay in this country, DAAD says.

The comment points to the "extremely effective" selection provisions for foreigners applying to study in Germany.

Resolutions adopted by the Education Ministers' Conference in the spring of 1981 had stopped the uncontrolled influx of students from Iran, Turkey, Greece and Indonesia (which accounted for one-third of the foreign student body). This had led to a drastic drop in the number of applications.

In the autumn of the same year, the Education Ministers introduced minimum academic and language qualifications for foreign students in addition to the earlier provisions.

A Cabinet resolution of December 1981 aimed at controlling the immigration of the next-of-kin of foreigners from non-EEC countries had made studying in West Germany less attractive, despite exemptions for those who, having passed their exams, wanted to go a step further in their academic qualifications.

Major problems were also being caused by the visa requirements for people intending to spend more than three months in Germany.

This means that people interested in studying in Germany could only obtain the necessary information and file their applications abroad.

Even once a German university had granted admission, applicants were unable to meet the deadlines for language and entrance exams because of the time it took to overcome the administrative hurdles.

Academic organisations dealing with foreign students had already registered a marked drop in the number of applicants. This has been confirmed by two German universities.

The number of foreigners' applications for studies at West Berlin's Technical University (which has an unusually high 18.4 per cent proportion of foreign students) dropped from 2,431 for the summer semester 1982 to 1,840 for the summer semester that has just ended.

In 1981, there were as many as 3,522 applicants.

In the winter semester, usually marked by a higher number of enrolments, the number of foreign applicants dropped within one year from 3,484 to 2,432 in the 1982/83 winter semester.

Karlsruhe University (8.1 per cent foreigners), which permitted enrolments only once a year, also had a 15 to 20 per cent drop to about 1,200 applications.

Another reason why DAAD considers length-of-stay limits for foreign students unnecessary is because the universities' examination provisions already curtail the length of studies. Language and entrance examinations could not be repeated indefinitely, and the preliminary examination must be completed by a specific semester.

Unless these deadlines were met, the residence permit could not be renewed anyway because it hinged on a student's stay at university. The introduction of a time limit for foreign students would split the student body into two classes.

"German universities would inevitably be seen abroad as practising discrimination," says DAAD.

The recommendation that foreigners be admitted only to specific faculties has also come under fire.

This would not only be a severe intrusion into the universities' sovereignty. It would also make mock of [...] partnership with the Third W[...]

DAAD sees no need for [...] tions here because most T[...] students already study subj[...] relevant to development.

This, too, has been confir[...] two universities interviewed [...] though the emphasis in the[...] on science and technology.

Only six per cent of the f[...] dents at the Technical Un[...] Berlin (90 per cent of them [...] the Third World) major in th[...] ties.

At Karlsruhe University, [...] per cent of the foreign stu[...] from the Third world, only [...] gners had enrolled for the [...] while 1,068 were studying sc[...] technological subjects.

Commenting on the recom[...] to exclude foreigners from [...] course of studies, DAAD main[...] very few of them wish to do [...] that measures against this ha[...] been taken by some universitie[...]

The suggestion that supp[...] studies and practical work be [...] in the time limit nullified a m[...] tegration aid on returning to t[...] country.

Particularly in the past fe[...] special supplementary studies [...] developed for the subsequent [...] application at home of the kn[...] acquired at university.

Practical experience as a [...] prepare for a career was d[...] Baden-Württemberg and [...] from Federal and state funds.

Bonn's aliens and universit[...] also see a psychological com[...] the issue: telling a highly [...] Third World student who be[...] developing country's elite (a[...] family or government is fina[...] studies) what he must study in [...] rests of his country is an insult.

Suse Weid[...]

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, [...])

Warning about degrees that are worthless

Germans wanting to study overseas are warned first to make sure that any academic qualification they earn will be recognised in Germany.

DAAD, the German Academic Exchange Service, says that in Germany, many foreign degrees are not worth the paper they are printed on. Most of the problems are with American degrees.

The organisation explains in a handout that employers find it often difficult to tell the difference between a acceptable and unacceptable foreign degrees.

Particularly at risk were working people who were transferred overseas and took foreign degrees in night classes or by correspondence.

Generally, it is safe to assume that diplomas earned at European state universities and accredited North American universities will be recognised here.

But German universities, Education Ministries and examining bodies always decide in retrospect whether and to what extent they are prepared to accept a foreign degree.

In Europe, studying abroad is helped by several agreements on the mutual recognition of diplomas and courses of study.

There have been agreements within the Council of Europe for more than 20 years on the equality of studies and university diplomas. But they are little more than declarations of intent and are therefore not binding for the 21 signatory nations.

Bilateral agreements like that between the Federal Republic of Germany and Austria and Switzerland are considerably more specific.

Students who have graduated in those countries are spared the recognition procedure by German examination bodies.

A similar agreement has now been signed with the Netherlands. Negotiations with France are still proceeding.

There are no barriers whatsoever for future doctors, dentists and veterinary surgeons who graduate in one of the ten EEC countries. They are subject to the EEC Council of Ministers provisions on the right of work for the self-employed.

These regulations provide for the mutual recognition of university diplomas within the Community.

In the case of diplomas that are not subject to agreements that have been approved by the *Länder*, there are two procedures to be followed by the holder of a foreign academic degree. Graduates must obtain permission to use a foreign degree in this country and they must have their curriculum evaluated to be permitted to continue studying at a German university or to engage in a profession.

The reason for this is to prevent abuse and misunderstandings.

"The public must be able t[...] the fact that somebody who [...] reign degree, either in his prof[...] in business, meets the standard[...] with this degree in the Federal [...] of Germany," says an informa[...] flet of the Baden-Württemberg [...] tion Ministry. This is why the [...] rised use of a foreign degree is p[...] ble by law.

But going through this red [...] well worthwhile, and not only [...] vent possible prosecution.

The recognition of the deg[...] hand-in-hand with an equality [...] cate that spells out that the for[...] gree equals a German one.

This makes it easier for futu[...] ployers to get a picture of an ap[...] academic achievements.

In most cases, the Education [...] tries insist that the foreign de[...] used in the form and language in [...] it was granted.

Using the German equivalent i[...] permissible if a comparison o[...] course of studies shows it to be [...] cal with that in a German univer[...]

The evaluation of foreign stud[...] those wishing to go on studying [...] done by the universities. They a[...] in a position to say what foreign [...] sities have cooperation agreemen[...] their German counterparts and [...] the mutual acceptance of degree[...] already been settled. This naturally [...]

Continued on page 13

RECORDS

Federal Archives keep an eye on the past



[...]e Federal Archives, in Koblenz, is [...]e organisation that proved that [...] Hitler Diaries bought by the maga[...] *Stern* were crude forgeries.

[...]st of the day-to-day work, how[...] is much less spectacular. Its job is [...]ovide for researchers and members [...] public as much information as [...]ble with the fewest possible docu[...]s.

[...]hen I visited the archives a staff [...]ber showed me a letter on the offi[...] stationery of the Third Reich.

[...] said: "The Hitler Diaries were [...] But this isn't." The document was [...]-well letter from the Führer to his [...]ood Minister, Walter Darré. Hitler's [...]ture was there at the bottom. So were the signatures of Bormann, Goebbels, Göring and Rosenberg.

The authenticity of the letter is not in doubt. There are few people as qualified to certify this as the Koblenz archivists.

Like thousands of other Third Reich documents, Hitler's letter to Darré was seized by the Western Allies in 1945 and then, in 1958, turned over to the archives, which had been established six years earlier.

But not all documents relating to Germany's past can be found in the 11-storey building with its two underground floors.

Many documents from German authorities dating between 1871 and 1919 fell into the hands of the Red Army during the chaotic days of 1945, much to the chagrin of German historians and archivists.

They are now stored at the GDR's Central State Archives in Potsdam.

The only documents from that period now in Koblenz are the files of the Prussian Ministries of Finance and Justice.

Meticulously sorted, packaged and catalogued, they now provide information on such aspects as the catches of the German fishing industry 100 years ago.

Other important original documents are now stored not only in the GDR but also in the national archives of the World War II victors.

Though the repatriation of documents from Paris, London and Washington was by and large completed in the late 1950s, there are still considerable gaps.

One of these gaps concerns the complete membership file of the Nazi Party which, together with other person-related documents of the Hitler era, is still stored in the West Berlin Document Centre administered by the US Army.

This Document Centre is, however, available to researchers and public prosecutors in war crime trials.

But this fragmentation does not mean that German historians have to abandon research projects. Many documents are available in Koblenz on microfilm and, so far, the GDR authorities have been cooperative.

The research exchange between East and West functions relatively well despite the fact that there is no cultural agreement between the two German states in sight.

But the gaps in the Koblenz Archives mean that the institution cannot fulfil the main task it has set itself: to become "this country's most comprehensive documentation centre for research into German history," as the head of the Archives, Professor Hans Booms, puts it.

The basic stock of historic documents is enlarged every year by about 70,000 Federal authority documents.

The main function of the institution is collecting, cataloguing and analysing the documents of the Federal government and its agencies.

The archivists have long since stopped keeping track of the number of documents in their care.

Instead, the measuring unit is a metre. The total stock would reach from Cologne to Koblenz: well over 90 kilometres.

On top of this, there is the extensive collection of political posters, photographs, films and tapes.

The archivist's job is painstaking and responsible. It calls for a sound knowledge of archive methods and history coupled with good jugment.

Documents have to be sorted. The archivist tries to preserve the original sequence of the documents. He puts together registers containing information on the contents of individual dossiers.

To keep the sheer amount of paper to a minimum, the archivist must be selective. He must judge the importance of each document.

After the obligatory ten-year keeping period for the documents of Bonn Ministries, anything that is important must go to Koblenz. The rest is shredded.

The aim is to make it as easy as possible for the user.

Apart from researchers, the files are used by about 2,700 members of the public every year.

Most people deal with the Aachen-Korneliusmünster branch of the Koblenz institution, where the personnel files of the Third Reich's armed forces (Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe and Waffen-SS) are kept, covering about 2.8 million World War II soldiers. Just about all the requests for information have to do with pension claims and similar matters.

The Freiburg branch houses the Military Archives, while the Rastatt branch is devoted to the "freedom movements in German history" and contains the relevant documents — especially from the time around 1848.

The Frankfurt branch houses primarily documents relating to the 1871 establishment of the Reich. These had to be restored in the Koblenz restoration workshops before being made accessible.

The current budget is DM22m a year, but director Booms complains about being understaffed.

The staff of 380 has remained unchanged for years but the number of documents to be processed and looked after is rising steadily.

There is, however, one silver lining: at the end of 1984 the archivists will move from their crowded quarters to brand new building in Koblenz.

Christopher Brügelmann

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 20 August 1983)

Friedrich P. Kahlenberg (left), director of the Federal Archives, shows a journalist where to look. (Photo: AP)

Foreign studies

Continued from page 12

[...]tes the transfer to a German univer[...]

[...]ate examination bodies rule on the [...]gnition of final results correspond[...] to the German *Staatsexamen*.

[...]he Federation of German Industry [...]es in a brochure that students with [...]gn experience applying for a job [...] an edge over students who have [...]led only in Germany.

[...]mployers in the private sector are [...]easingly complaining about the un[...]ingness of German students to study [...]oad. But this is a limited criticism.

[...]ersonnel department heads are not [...]much interested in a foreign degree [...] a semester or two abroad as part [...] German university education.

[...]ince only 18,000 of Germany's 1.2 [...]lion university students summoned [...]courage last year to go abroad and [...] economic interdependence and [...]nological progress are making in[...]try increasingly dependent on mana[...]al personnel with foreign experi[...], a sound foreign diploma never[...]less paves the way for a career.

Frank A. Linden

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 13 August 1983)

■ CRIME

Hamburg's red light goes on the blink

Frankfurter Allgemeine

Mischa Luchting's funeral late last autumn is still the talk of St Pauli, Hamburg's red-light district. Everyone who was anyone on the Reeperbahn was there. So were the TV cameras.

A friend threw into his grave the radiator mascot of the de luxe English car Mischa had driven. Rumour has it that the figure-head was exhumed that same night.

If the rumour is true it would be very much in keeping with the circumstances in which Luchting, who was just over 30, met his death.

A former leading member of GMBH, a gang of St Pauli pimps, he was found hanged. His Hamburg friends had taken over his side of the business while he was in custody in Gran Canaria.

He spent several months under arrest in connection with charges of living on immoral earnings. He returned to find even his apartment had been cleaned out.

Mischa was the M in GMBH. Gerd, the G, was recently arrested when the Hamburg police put the city's Hell's Angels behind bars.



Goodbye to a dear friend and beloved colleague. Mischa Luchting, the 'M' of the GMBH, gets a touching farewell at a Hamburg cemetery. From left, in dark glasses, Harry Voerthmann (the 'H' of GMBH), Uwe Schwensen (Mischa's replacement in the organisation), and 'Beatle' Vogeler (the 'B' of GMBH) (Photo: dpa)

Angie and SS Klaus, two other leading members of the St Pauli underworld, were killed in a shoot-out between GMBH and Nutella, another gang.

The police say there are about 6,000 prostitutes and 450 bars in St Pauli, an area of about half a square kilometre. The bars range from the humblest drinking establishment to the most exclusive night club.

They all have one point in common. Business and the atmosphere in St Pauli have taken a turn for the worse.

From April to November about 35,000 people still visit the Reeperbahn every evening, but business is not what it was.

Ludwig Rielandt, the officer in charge of the Davidwache, the Reeperbahn police station, is well aware of the background that has led to this state of affairs.

Unemployment has sent more women on to the streets to ease their financial straits by a stint at the world's oldest profession.

Unemployment has also meant there are fewer men around with money to spend on a prostitute, and those that have money to burn have less of it.

So competition between prostitutes and their pimps has intensified, so much so, Herr Rielandt says, that some women are trying to persuade other women's regular customers to switch allegiance.

In days gone by, when business was better, that would have been an unpardonable sin in St Pauli.

Bars and clubs are beset by problems too. Sexually explicit shows are an attraction only for people who are in town on a visit from the countryside.

As for serious drinking, many visitors who in the past would have been good customers think twice before having a real night out.

A number of bars have taken to trickery to boost their turnover, and complaints have been so frequent that the police have issued a leaflet warning visitors what may befall them.

"Be careful when you are offered a cut-price drink," they are warned, for one. The bottle of beer may cost only five marks in the strip club, but the gin the waiter persuades you to have with it could cost fifty.

The price is bona fide. It is sure to be on the menu, and the menu will doubtless be on the table. But views could differ on whether it is clearly on display.

It could be printed on paper that is the same colour as the table cloth, and as likely as not it will be weighed down and covered by an ashtray and a glass full of straws.

When the management send a girl over to keep the customers happy many a man has been known to cast caution to the winds and forget about the bill.

But the police have kept an eye on bars about which complaints of this kind are registered, and there are now only about 10 in the St Pauli area, Herr Rielandt says.

Business is so poor that people who earn their living as touts or by screening blue films and running peep shows, by organised prostitution or just ordinary discotheques have grown restless and irritable.

St Pauli people once had a reputation for keeping together through thick and thin. It is fast fraying at the [...] putes are more readily [...] than they used to be.

Above all, the men who [...] big money as pimps and [...] Center apartments have [...] lucrative sidelines such as [...] dealing in stolen property.

These are lines of business [...] they need to organise, [...] there has been an increase [...] ber of gangs in St Pauli, [...] police have noted with dismay.

In spring 1982 Hamburg's [...] fairs senator, Alfons Pawelc[zyk] [...] a special commission cons[isting of] hand-picked men to comba[t] crime.

The gangs have since s[uffered a] number of setbacks. Last [...] restaurateur Wilfried Schulz [...] others were taken into custody.

They were accused of offe[nces rang]ing from living on immoral e[arnings to] grievous bodily harm. He was [...] cused of supporting a crimina[l organi]sation.

Schulz, one of St Pauli's [...] kings, is still in custody. He is [...] to have been on the best of [...] leading police officers, especi[ally] chief Hans Zühlsdorf, who has [...] tired. But there has never [...] proof.

The Nutella and GMBH [...] tions have come under heavy [...] Mischa Luchting of GMBH [...] "Beatle," the B of GMBH, wa[s] [...] last May on tax evasion ch[arges] [...] only released on paym[ent of] DM500,000 in bail.

Beatle's apartments have [...] been searched by the police. [...] pected of links with the Diam[...] Gang, a gang who have robbed [...] banks in Hesse.

Herr Pawelczyk made it clea[r] [...] determined to drain the swamp [...] in the city and instructed the [...] leave no holds barred.

The Senator, who was pre[...] Social Democratic MP in Bonn [...] party's defence and disarmam[ent spo]kesman, forced controversial [...] chief Günter Redding to retire.

Herr Redding officially re[tired for] health reasons, of course. He is [...] have been too slack in his lead[ership of] the city police force for 14 years.

Those were the days! In [...] months there have been repeated [...] lines in the local Press such a[s] [...] Arrest Brutal Pimps."

In June the police raided [...] bars and closed down 18 illegal [...] ing establishment.

From next January peep sh[ows will] no longer be allowed to show [...] performing to a full circle of [...] chine cubicles.

In October the Davidwache [will] house a new CID department [...] ble for dealing with prostitution, [...] white slavery, gambling and card [...] all over Hamburg.

These are all offences that [...] quently occur in St Pauli, an are[a] [...] most people "neither act nor [...] mally," as Herr Rielandt puts it, [...] that goes for many visitors [...] have had a drink or two."

Brain not brawn is what the [...] need to handle the problems [...] Police officers who work in St [...] need both sociological and psych[ologi]cal training to deal with what ca[n hap]pen.

Their aim is to make St Pauli [...] for visitors and a more attractiv[e] [...] to visit.

Thomas Vinsor W[...]

(Frankfurter Allgemeine [Zeitung] für Deutschland, 23 Aug[ust 1983])

[B]EHAVIOUR

Why crime flourishes in high-rise housing

[Hi]gh-rise concrete mass housing complexes do not in themselves [...] crime, a study says.

[Pro]mpted by the widely discussed [...] barely researched above-average [crime] rate in such housing schemes, so[ciolog]ist Uwe Meier took a closer look [at the] mammoth Steilshoop low-income [housi]ng project in Hamburg. It houses [...]der 20,000.

[The] sociologist's main objective was [to fin]d out whether the high crime rate [in suc]h housing projects was because of [social] conditions or impersonal and [mon]otonous design.

[The] study, prepared at Hamburg [Univer]sity's Sociology Department, fo[cused] on the geographical distribution [in] Steilshoop of the homes of chil[dren a]nd juveniles suspected of crimes.

[It i]s known that the juvenile delin[quenc]y rate is particularly high in such [housin]g complexes. But the distribution [of del]inquency within Steilshoop is very [...]n and varies markedly from block [to blo]ck. Most crime is in the central [...], around double the rate of a [...]on the fringes.

[...]me largely coincides with the so[...] patterns.

[Blo]cks with high crime rates, the [study] shows, have a high proportion of [welfa]re recipients and children and ju[venile]s from broken homes or from [home]s where alcoholism, drugs and vio[lence]*, play* a big role.

[Th]is suggests that juvenile delinquen[cy is] primarily due to social conditions [that p]revent people from adopting ap[prove]d standards of conduct and mor[...].

[Con]struction and architectural fea[tures s]eem to have no effect on the du[ration] of tenancy or turnover. What litt[le eff]ect they have has to do with the [num]ber of people living in one housing [unit (]i. e. the proportion of children and [fam]ilies without a room of their own).

[Th]e high crime rates can therefore [not b]e attributed to such catchphrases as "concrete," "monotonous facades" and "high-rise" because all Steilshoop blocks are concrete, have similar facades and the same proportion of high-rise buildings.

If these features, rather than social criteria, had a strong effect on criminal behaviour, all blocks would have to have the same crime rate, the study suggests.

The apparent close link between architecture and the crime rate is due to their poor public image and low social status.

Large numbers of socially disadvantaged groups with next to no chance of finding housing on the open market are housed together in these complexes.

There is a concentration of problem families in certain sections of Steilshoop because the landlords apply different criteria in selecting tenants: private landlords and cooperatives tend to reject broken families while certain institutions accept virtually all comers. This leads to a concentration of problem families in theses blocks. As a result, there is also a higher rate of suspects here than in the blocks owned by cooperatives and private individuals.

A comparison of crime rates in Hamburg as a whole and in Steilshoop shows that the crime rate for the district of Steilshoop is lower than the across-the-board city rate.

In 1978, the rate was 8,849 known crimes per 100,000 inhabitants for Steilshoop compared with 10,680 for Hamburg as a whole.

But while the actual crime rate for the borough of Steilshoop was below average, the ratio of suspected persons was above average.

In 1978, the police had 3,940 suspects (per 100,000 inhabitants) in Steilshoop compared with 3,490 in Hamburg.

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 20 August 1983)



All at sea on a bike

Günther Mertins, 35, from Freiburg, wanted to sail across the eastern Atlantic from Schleswig-Holstein to Portugal. So early in July he set off on his home-made raft consisting of six large barrels. On board was also a bicycle . . . just in case. On 22 August, the raft was found on the high seas — without Günther. It seemed that his "philosophical experience", as he had described it to his mother before setting off — had had tragic consequences. But on 25 August, it was established that both the raft and its captain had been taken in tow by a Spanish ship. Then Günther abandoned his craft and went on board the Spanish ship, leaving the raft and bicycle to their fate. (Photo: dpa)

Housewives learn how to have a fulfilling middle life

Many housewives whose children have grown up and left home want to lead active lives again.

This mid-life period can easily turn into a mid-life crisis for women who do not manage to break out of their four walls, says by Baden-Württemberg's Labour and Social Affairs Ministry by the Freiburg project group *Neuer Start ab 35* (New Start after 35).

The project group, which tries to show women how to shape this new phase of their lives, was founded by the Freiburg *Frauenring* (women's circle).

Using *Neuer Start ab 35* as its slogan, the group invited non-working women to attend courses and discussions for three months.

The main achievement was to instil self-confidence and equip them to make decisions.

Most women found that their lives gained new meaning.

State Labour Minister Dietmar Schlee stressed that many women had little hope of getting back into the mainstream of life.

"We must help them because our society needs the experience and strength of women who have spent years working for their families."

Psychologist Brigitte Fahrenbach, who assessed the group's work, said: "An intense desire to learn and a feeling of being unfulfilled are the most important motivations of the women who attend the courses."

Participants might decide to go back to work, take on further training, go in for unpaid social work or simply stay within the family.

Says one participant: "For me it was like a long-awaited anchor."

The curriculum is divided into three main sections. Section one comprises lectures on psychology, education, language, various forms of communication and health.

Section two includes such creative pursuits as rhythmic movement and dance and the visual arts.

Section three deals with law, labour-related matters and politics.

The curriculum also provides for a wide range of information, suggestions and orientation aids.

The idea is to bring to the fore a wide range of dormant talents and abilities. But above all, the participants are encouraged to be independent and participate in a variety of public tasks.

The success of the Freiburg project is not only due to the well-thought-out curriculum but also to the commitment of the staff.

The pilot scheme, which is now to be promoted nation-wide, has three phases: a motivation phase with teaching and discussion on possible interests, a two-week practical phase in which the participants are familiarised with working life to enable them to realistically review their ideas for the future and an "after-care" phase to help them in the transition period. *Waldemar Kelberg*

(Frankfurter Neue Presse, 27 August 1983)

Torture victims try to beat the nightmares

[P]eople who come to see the Chilean [p]sychologist Carlos Corvalan at the [Psych]osocial Centre in Frankfurt talk [abou]t things that would otherwise go [unme]ntioned: torture, fear, humiliation [and] pain.

[So]me 600 people have consulted Cor[valan] since he opened his practice in [...]. But this is only a small part of the [thera]peutic work done at the centre, [which] employs another Chilean, and [Ethi]opian, an Afghan and several Ger[man] psychologists in addition to Corva[lan].

[Hi]s patients complain about being [una]ble to concentrate, memory gaps, [nigh]tmares, headaches and sexual dis[orde]rs. They are depressed and tend to [be i]rritable.

[P]ersecuted at home, they came to this [coun]try seeking asylum. This meant [that] on top of their exile they had to put [up w]ith transit camps, an initial ban on [seeki]ng a job, recognition procedures for [asyl]um seekers and a political atmos[phe]re that is anything but favourable [to] political refugees.

Even so, Corvalan, himself a refugee [fro]m the repression at home, regards [exi]le as the better solution for victims of [to]rture, despite the fact that they have to start from scratch in a strange country.

But for many of these people "the experiences here are worse than the torture at home."

The effects of camp life on people who have already suffered severe psychological damage is disastrous, he says.

Most of his patients are apathetic to the point where they give the impression of being heavily drugged.

The therapy is eintended to give victims firm ground under their feet. But this is a long process in the case of torture victims, who mentally still live in their home countries.

The mere sight of a policeman, a bathtub or a striplight can make the torture come alive again and cause panic and fear.

So far, the centre, sponsored by the regional Protestant Association, is the only institution of its kind in the Federal Republic, says Carlos Corvalan.

The therapy can take anything between three months and two years.

It is not restricted to making the patient mentally overcome the torture but is designed as a comprehensive help for refugees in general who are faced with new difficulties from one day to the next.

Corvalan says the experience of torture can be overcome if a person has not been totally broken and lost all self-esteem.

The torture itself is usually experienced as something shameful. Men suffer most from the fact of having been turned into "traitors" under torture while women suffer primarily from having submitted to rape to "get it over with as quickly as possible."

More and more psychologists are becoming convinced now that it is not so much the tortured people themselves but their next-of-kin who suffer the most severe long-term damage due to their pathologically heightened mistrust and fear.

Josefin Adler/epd

(Allgemeine Zeitung Mainz, 19 August 1983)